Metropolitan Geography, Electoral Participation, and Partisan Competition

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Abstract

Throughout the developed world and beyond, diversified metropolitan regions have replaced the centuries-old divide between city and countryside. In the varied polities of contemporary democracies, the common geographies of metropolitan regions have given rise to parallel territorial patterns of electoral participation and partisan orientations. This paper, drawing on a pooled eleven-country ecological dataset, presents results from the first systematic international comparative analysis of these patterns. We find that the contextual effects from metropolitan places on voting go beyond what the social and economic composition of those places can explain. Parties from across the partisan spectrum now look to strongholds in particular types of metropolitan settings, and compete for dominance in others. In metropolitanized democracies, stronger electoral mobilization among low-density, affluent and middle class suburbs has skewed electoral competition. Metropolitan geographies thus embed electoral advantages for parties on the Right, and for parties that embrace neoliberal policy agendas.

With the advent of the 21st century, metropolitan areas have become the dominant form of human settlement. Regardless of the national historical differences in processes of urbanisation, a number of common elements now characterise metropolitan areas throughout the world. As areas of dispersed settlement, they stretch across a multiplicity of communities and jurisdictional boundaries. Flows of capital, labour, services and goods act as the glue that integrates communities across metropolitan territories. Metropolitan regions are embedded in national and transnational urban hierarchies. Some serve as economic or cultural centres for a nation or a continent. Others specialise in particular kinds of activities that dominate the local economy.

This volume has investigated how the characteristics of metropolitan places influence political behaviour within and among their constituent communities. The results show the need to rethink presumptions that have long stood at the core of thinking about the geography of modern elections and party systems. The *nationalisation* thesis, which emerged during the time of rapid industrialisation in Western Europe and North America, attempted to account for the earlier evolution of national political systems out of segmented territorial regions. In a nationalised system, electoral competition and contestation occur between national social and economic constituencies based on class, ethnicity, or other identities, rather than between geographic places. If territorial variation persists, then it must be due to the social composition of those territories. In a nationalised political system, places are merely containers for the political behaviour of different social groups.

As diverse, expanding metropolitan regions have overwhelmed and supplanted old social identities based on the urban/rural divide, metropolitan territorial influences have emerged to call this view of political behaviour into question. Territorial variations within and between metropolitan regions now comprise a major influence on whether and how citizens vote. More than the result of random social and economic sorting, these variations are a product of metropolitan places themselves. Identical social groups living in metropolitan places with distinct interests and lifestyles behave in starkly different ways. When they reside in densely populated core cities, where economies of scale favour collective provision of services such as public transport or public day care, they tend to support programs of state provision. When they reside in outlying low-density municipalities, where similar services are more difficult to coordinate collectively, the same groups support market provision and privatisation over state programs. Even when people can choose their place of residence, those choices remain a function of the alternatives embedded in existing metropolitan settlement structures. Living in one or another setting reinforces prevailing preferences. The metropolitan spatial context thus retains significant power to explain the political behaviour of a community.

The metropolitanisation thesis exemplifies a relationship between scales that is intrinsic to many other contemporary processes of global economic and social change, from transformations in capitalism (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994) to post-modern cultural shifts (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Although national and even global in its extent and impact, metropolitanisation has taken

place at the local and regional scale. Within societies dominated by pervasive metropolitan patterns, parties of both the Left and Right have found new territorial electoral strongholds, and new sources of advantage and disadvantage in the competition for votes. Influences from metropolitan places on electoral mobilisation have altered the balance of power among these electoral constituencies. Over the last twenty years, the cumulative impact of these territorial reconfigurations has been a persistent electoral advantage for the parties of the Right, and for the neoliberal agendas they have increasingly advocated. Metropolitanisation has been a key factor in the rise and pervasive influence of neoliberalism.

Metropolitan territorial configurations pose challenges to the nationalisation thesis in several ways. Metropolitanisation has interposed a new set of intraregional territorial divides. Rather than rooted in traditional regional differences, these place-based configurations of political consciousness are embedded in localities and neighbourhoods, and in different metropolitan structures. Rather than remain divided into segmented, largely uniform regional cultures, metropolitan places are linked to each other through flows of commuting, consumption and markets. Among regions that have converged toward similar patterns of metropolitan structure, territorial divisions rooted in metropolitan life may also erode traditional regional differences in political culture. Even when metropolitanisation has had nationalising effects of this kind, it has supplemented or supplanted regional divides with metropolitan and local ones.

Metropolitan territorial effects are more contested than the regional party configurations that dominated earlier patterns of territorial variation (Caramani 2004). As metropolitan populations have grown into majorities of the electorate throughout most developed countries, competition for suburban votes has drawn national parties from across much of the ideological spectrum toward neoliberal and culturally conservative agendas. Even as these parties retain territorial strongholds in certain types of metropolitan places, competition for swing communities has frequently produced volatile or mixed territorial patterns of metropolitan support.

Finally, nationalisation implies that national parties operate as vertically integrated organisations, and that community behaviour in local elections follows patterns in national elections. Instead, a layered examination of metropolitan patterns reveals numerous multilevel dynamics in both electoral behaviour and the economic, social and spatial influences that shape it.

This chapter concludes this volume with a comparative multi-level analysis of these overarching patterns. The dataset we employ is compiled from the national datasets analysed in all the separate country chapters in Sellers et al. (2013).[1] It includes 13,300 municipalities located in 175 metropolitan areas in

[1] The compilation of this database was a Herculean task. It would not have been possible without the competence and the relentless support of Philippe Rochat, who patiently resolved, one after the other, the numerous problems of data incompatibility and inconsistency and managed to construct a truly integrated database. In order to avoid misspecification of indicators across

eleven countries (Table 1). Alongside analysis of the cross-national commonalities and differences, the integrated dataset enables an exploration of metropolitan influences that the smaller numbers of metropolitan areas did not permit in some of the country chapters. The first section of the chapter will focus on patterns of electoral turnout, the second on patterns of partisanship.

Table 1: Metropolitan municipalities/communities, metropolitan areas and countries in the overall sample

Country	Total number of metropolitan areas	Total number of municipalities/ communities*	Type of municipalities/communities*					
			Urban concentrations	Poor (hardship) suburbs		Middle class suburbs	Affluent suburbs	Low density suburbs
				High minority	Low minority			
United States	12	1.935	22	300	317	473	298	525
Canada	11	369	35	21	32	141	54	86
United Kingdom	20	394	135	14	17	150	39	39
France	42	6.774	50	331	843	2.298	539	2.713
Switzerland	7	482	7		119	119	119	118
Germany	21	1.166	38		270	363	231	264
Spain	30	1.053	51		228	456	228	90
Sweden	3	39	3	1	5	16	6	8
Poland	21	427	32		80	149	69	97
Czech Republic	4	464	5		75	190	101	93
Israel	4	197	14	70	26	30	13	44
Total	175	13.300	392		2.749	4.385	1.697	4.077

Notes: * = In Canada and the United Kingdom, a lack of sufficient municipalities in many metropolitan regions required the substitution of electoral districts for the purposes of categorising communities. In some cases the boundaries of such districts adhere to those of municipalities, but in many metros there are many more such districts than there are municipalities (indeed, in many cases there are only one or two municipalities for the entire metropolitan area).

Metropolitan patterns of electoral participation

Political participation is the foundation of democracy, and participation in elections is perhaps the most fundamental act of democratic citizenship. Moreover, it is one of the most reliable and readily available empirical indicators of political behaviour. A first step toward unravelling the metropolitan determinants of political behaviour has therefore consisted of an analysis of turnout in local and national elections[2], aggregated to the municipal level. Analysis of this dataset demonstrates clear limits to the nationalisation of

countries, the integrated database has been confined to only those variables that are identical in all the countries (see the procedures described in the methodological appendices).

[2] Except for the U.S. results, all the country data and analyses of turnout presented are based on official electoral data. This means that the turnout rate is based on a comparison of the number of voters and the number of registered electors. In the U.S., voluntary voter registration leaves official tallies of eligible voters much less representative than in other countries. U.S. turnout data here is based on census figures for the voting age population who are naturalised or native born citizens (see Sellers 2013).

electoral behaviour, and the importance of systematic differences at the metropolitan and local levels to patterns of voting turnout.

Nationalisation, Localisation or Fragmentation?

What cross-national political effects has metropolitanisation had? The pooled dataset of national and municipal results enables an analysis of the territorial heterogeneity of local participatory patterns at both municipal and national levels. In addition to uniformity, the nationalisation of politics implies integration of municipal elections into national electoral patterns. The comparison of municipal and national turnout rates provides the first rigorous cross-national test of this dimension of nationalisation.

Figure 1: Relations between national and local electoral participation, overall means by countries



Table 2: Territorial Heterogeneity of Metropolitan Turnout in Municipal Elections by Country

	Election(s)	S (Standard Deviation)	National S Post-WWII (Caramani 2005)	S^2 (Variance)	National S2 Post-WWII (Caramani 2005)	MAD: Mean Absolute Deviation	National MAD Post-WWII (Caramani 2005)	MSD: Mean Squared Deviation	National MSD Post-WWII (Caramani 2005)	IPR	Variability Coefficient	N
United States	1996-2003	12.85		165.07		10.38		164.97		0.41	0.41	1606
Canada	mid-2000s	14.58		212.48		12.13		210.96		0.36	0.32	140
Switzerland	1996-2005	13.87	14.32	192.45	212.66	11.45	10.59	191.83	205.88	0.35	0.30	314
Israel	1999-2003	15.92		253.48		13.42		252.01		0.30	0.22	172
East-Germany	1999-2003	9.13		83.35		7.48		83.13		0.26	0.16	371
Poland	1994-2002	6.82		46.49		5.44		46.38		0.25	0.16	445
Czech Republic	1994-2002	9.54		90.93		7.36		90.74		0.24	0.14	464
France	2001	9.73	3.40	94.58	11.82	7.83	2.56	94.57	11.69	0.23	0.13	6784
Germany	1999-2003	7.36	6.49	54.22	23.02	5.79	2.55	54.17	22.15	0.22	0.13	1159
Spain	1995-2003	8.80	6.01	77.49	36.68	7.26	4.48	77.42		0.22	0.12	1049
West-Germany	1999-2003	6.31		39.82		4.99		39.77		0.21	0.11	788
United Kingdom	2004 (London only)	3.06	5.75	9.38	34.51	2.62	4.14	9.10	34.46	0.20	0.09	33
Sweden	1998-2002	4.46	1.54	19.89	2.91	3.47	1.21	19.38	2.81	0.15	0.06	39

Notes: For calculation of indexes see Caramani (2004, 2005). Indexes from Caramani (2005: 307) based on Lower Chamber legislative elections.

Table 3: Territorial Heterogeneity of Metropolitan Turnout in National Elections by Country

	Election(s)	S (Standard Deviation)	Overall S Post-WWII (Caramani 2005)	S^2 (Variance)	Overall S^2 Post-WWII (Caramani 2005)	MAD: Mean Absolute Deviation	Overall MAD Post-WWII (Caramani 2005)	MSD: Mean Squared Deviation	Overall MSD Post-WWII (Caramani 2005)	IPR	Variability Coefficient	N
United States	1996-2004	11.96		142.98		9.37		142.90		0.28	0.20	1841
Poland	1993-2001	6.98		48.71		5.74		48.60		0.25	0.15	445
Switzerland	1999-2003	6.72	14.32	45.12	212.66	5.41	10.59	45.03	205.88	0.25	0.15	482
United Kingdom	2001 (England + Wales)	6.61	5.75	43.65	34.51	5.41	4.14	43.53	34.46	0.22	0.12	361
Israel	1999-2003	8.41		70.72		6.54		70.36		0.21	0.11	197
Canada	2006	5.01		25.13		3.85		24.97		0.17	0.08	156
Spain	1996-2004	5.83	6.01	33.95	36.68	4.52	4.48	33.92		0.17	0.08	1052
Czech Republic	1996-2002	5.36		28.73		4.23		28.66		0.17	0.07	464
France	2001	5.51	3.40	30.41	11.82	4.32	2.56	30.40	11.69	0.17	0.07	6784
East-Germany	1998-2002	5.08		25.80		4.26		25.73		0.17	0.07	373
Germany	1998-2002	4.80	6.49	23.01	23.02	3.63	2.55	22.99	22.15	0.15	0.06	1162
Sweden	1998-2002	3.54	1.54	12.50	2.91	2.74	1.21	12.18	2.81	0.13	0.04	39
West-Germany	1998-2002	2.82		7.94		2.21		7.93		0.12	0.03	789

Notes: For calculation of indexes see Caramani (2004, 2005). Indexes for France and U.S. from Caramani (2005) based on Lower Chamber legislative elections.

Comparison by country of the (unweighted) average turnout for the two types of elections (municipal and national) reveals striking differences in this dimension (Figure 1). In several countries, high average participation in both types of elections leaves little doubt that there is strong national-local electoral integration. In Sweden, France, Israel and Spain, turnout rates for both types of elections average 70 per cent or higher. Since the electorate for municipal elections in Sweden includes all resident noncitizens, and in the other EU countries all resident EU citizens, the convergence of turnout in these countries is all the more impressive.[3]

In other countries a tendency toward de-localisation is clear. In the Anglo-American nations of the United States, Canada and the UK (albeit in the latter case, based on a much more limited London area sample) this de-localised pattern is most pronounced. Average national turnout rates in these countries have approached or exceeded 60 per cent, but local voter turnout rates ranging from 46 per cent (in Canada) to 31 per cent (in the U.S.) give rise to significant turnout gaps between the two scales of governance. More limited de-localisation is also present in West Germany.

The lower national and municipal turnout rates in Switzerland indicate a more general voter disengagement as well as limited national-local integration. This is the only nation that can truly be characterised as having a generally localised political culture, although subnational and national electoral dynamics are becoming increasingly integrated (Selb 2006).

The three postcommunist territories, where a general disengagement from voting has also been noted (Kostadinova 2003), reveal some distinct patterns. In each, participation in one type of election or the other averages lower than in settled democracies with relatively similar systems of institutions. In East Germany, participation averages lower than in West Germany. In the Czech Republic turnout in local elections is lower than in other systems with similarly stable party systems and high national turnout. In Poland, both national and local participation average relatively low.

Comparison of overall turnout rates in national and local elections already suggests important variations in the way that electoral institutions function. To further assess how these variations might be related to metropolitanisation and nationalisation we turn our attention to how uniformly turnout rates vary among metropolitan territories. An established line of research focused on the territorial homogeneity of electoral behaviour across time and space has developed several indices for this purpose (Caramani 2005). Tables 2 and 3 show calculations of six such indexes for the metropolitan dataset, by country: the standard deviation; the variance: the mean absolute deviation; the mean squared deviation; the variability coefficient, and the IPR index. The latter, based on the differences between the turnout rate in each municipality and the overall mean of turnout across all municipalities, takes into account the number and size of

[3] As a result, rules for nonvoting by noncitizens correlated negatively with turnout in the pooled dataset and any independent effects from those rules could not be sorted out.

municipalities (Table 2 and Table 3). For purposes of illustration, Figure 2 displays the IPR values for turnout rates in local and national elections.

Figure 2: Territorial heterogeneity of voter turnout (national and municipal elections) in the metropolitan areas of eleven countries (IPR index)



Notes: *National elections*: France: 2001 (presidential election), US: 1996-2004 (presidential election), Sweden: 1998-2002, Switzerland: 1999-2003, Israel: 1999-2003, Czech Republic: 1996-2002, UK: 2001, Germany: 1998-2002, Poland: 1993-2001, Canada: 2006, Spain: 1996-2004. *Municipal elections*: France: 2001, USA: 1996-2003, Sweden: 1998-2002, Switzerland: 1996-2005, Israel: 1999-2003, Czech Republic: 1994-2002, Germany: 1999-2003, Poland: 1994-2002, Canada: mid-2000s (Montréal, Vancouver and Toronto metropolitan areas), Spain: 1995-2003. * = UK local election turnout for Greater London Authority election only (2004).

The six indices converge around similar results. Within most countries, they show significant variation in the electoral participation of metropolitan municipalities. In municipal elections this territorial heterogeneity is especially pronounced. For every country analysed in Caramani (2004) except Switzerland, the metropolitan indices of variability in municipal election turnout range consistently higher than corresponding figures for national elections based on all national election districts (Table 2). In France, Germany, Spain and Sweden, metropolitan municipal turnout varies more dramatically, producing index values at double or triple the national figures. Even in national elections, where turnout rates are generally more uniform (Figure 2), the metropolitan indexes in most of these countries are somewhat higher than those for all parliamentary constituencies in national elections (Table 3). Only in two of the most territorialised countries, Spain and Switzerland, do slightly lower metropolitan indices of variability imply somewhat more uniform results among metropolitan localities than among national legislative districts.

The territorial heterogeneity of metropolitan voting propensities varies significantly among countries (Figure 2). On one end of the spectrum, metropolitan communities in the USA, Switzerland, Israel and Canada reveal widely differing turnout levels. The great variability in these countries is especially evident in local elections (Table 2), but apparent even at the highest level of national elections (Table 3). In the post-Communist countries, including (former) East Germany, tendencies toward nationalisation are also more qualified than in Western European countries. In Poland, the variability of turnout in national elections ranges considerably higher than in local elections. At the other end of the spectrum, the relatively homogenous territorial distribution of turnout in Sweden and West Germany indicates more nationalised patterns of electoral participation.

National differences in institutions, from electoral systems to local government systems, account for much of the variation in municipal political behaviour. Despite the relatively small number of twelve country cases, simple bivariate correlations between several explanatory variables at the country level and these national patterns point to numerous relationships that approach or exceed statistical significance (Table 4). The predominance of metropolitan regions in national politics is strongly related to more general patterns of electoral participation, as dominant metropolitan constituencies mobilise in national elections at the expense of more marginal ones. National rates of metropolitanisation, measured here by the proportion of the national population residing in metropolitan areas with populations over 200,000 reveal the highest positive correlation with a large national-local turnout gap (at .513, $p<.10$) (cf. Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers 2005).

Especially in municipal elections, systematic effects derive from well-known differences in local government institutions and in relations between local and national politics (see Morlan 1984; Page and Goldsmith 1987; Hesse and Sharpe 1991; Goldsmith and Page 2010). For example, in 'civic localist' systems, such as the United States, Switzerland and Canada, much of local participation takes place outside of council elections, institutions for local governance differ widely among municipalities, and local politics and elections maintain fewer links to national politics (Sellers and Kwak 2011). As the consistently significant correlations demonstrate, this form of local governance is clearly associated with lower turnout at both levels of government, as well as greater spatial variation in turnout at both levels.

In contrast, 'local elitist' systems maintain stronger links between national and local politics, a factor that Morlan (1984) found to increase electoral mobilisation in local elections (the correlation is .503, $p<.10$). In southern European countries like France and Spain, 'political localism' (Page 1991) has relied on local elected officials to represent local concerns within higher level governments. In countries such as Germany, the Czech Republic, and Israel, strong links between local and national party organisations account for vertical integration (Deschouwer 2003; Razin 1998). Such forms of integration are strongest in the relatively 'nationalised' local government system of Sweden

(Sellers and Lidström 2007), where both national and local turnout in metropolitan localities are highest and most uniform.

Table 4: Bivariate correlations of average local/municipal turnout with national institutions

	Average municipal turnout	Average national turnout	Average turnout gap	Municipal turnout IPR	National turnout IPR	Turnout gap IPR	N
National metropolitanisation	-.214	.151	*.513*	.267	.093	-.275	12
Civic localist local government (Sellers and Kwak 2011)	**-.794**	***-.636***	.484	***.642***	*.558*	-.381	11
Nationalised local government (Sellers and Kwak 2011)	.429	.368	-.232	-.477	-.406	.291	11
Local elitist local government (Sellers and Kwak 2011)	*.519*	.402	-.334	-.345	-.305	.200	11
Third wave of democratization (Huntington 1993)	.128	.031	-.159	-.223	-.039	.264	12
Proportional representation (national)	.478	.161	-*.568*	-.344	-.253	.244	11
Proportional representation (local council)	***.670***	*.575*	-.361	-.498	-.530	.212	11
Election day is rest day or holiday	***.733***	.328	**-.770**	-.468	-.381	.299	11
Easy voting index (Blais et al.)	.068	-.077	-.204	-.095	-.184	-.030	11
Election day registration	.063	-.016	-.121	-.126	-.184	.012	11
Compulsory registration	.287	-.055	-.531	.017	.022	-.005	11

Notes: Where N = 12, sample includes separate units for East and West Germany.
For italicized coefficients, p<.10; for boldface coefficients, p<.05; for boldface italicized coefficients, p<.01.

Among other national institutions, proportional and mixed compensatory electoral systems have been shown to foster electoral participation to a significantly greater degree than first-past-the-post and majoritarian systems (Blais et al. 2003). In voting systems that are proportional, every vote has an effect on the result. Since even voters for small parties can expect their preferred party to gain at least some seats in the legislature, voter turnout under these systems should be higher. The direction of the correlations for average turnout is consistent with this hypothesis, but only proportional representation in local council elections correlates significantly with higher turnout (in local elections 0.643, and in national elections 0.601, both p<.05). National rules of electoral administration also play a role. Turnout is higher when the electoral legislation facilitates the exercise of the right to vote (Blais et al. 2003). Holding elections on a public holiday correlates with both higher municipal turnout and a lower turnout gap.[4]

[4] Blais et al. (2003) also construct an 'ease of voting' index that aggregates opportunities to vote by correspondence, in advance or by proxy. Facilitating voter registration by making it obligatory, by making it possible to register on Election Day, or by making the government rather than individual citizens responsible for taking the initiative in registration can also raise the turnout rate. Although correlations demonstrated no significant relation between these conditions and the national turnout averages, the directions of the correlations generally corresponded to expectations.

In the metropolitan areas in this study, the national integration of electoral participation rates remains limited. An overview of turnout means from all eleven countries in the dataset (Figure 3) confirms considerable cross-national variations in degrees of nationalisation, especially in local elections. Whatever the effects from national institutions, the wide variations within countries often approach or exceed the range of differences among these national averages. Only in a few countries, notably Sweden and West Germany, do figures for municipal and national turnout cluster tightly around the overall mean. Only these countries can be considered to possess fully integrated systems.[5]

Figure 3: Turnout in national and municipal elections in metropolitan municipalities of ten countries (West and East-Germany as two separate countries)



Understanding Multi-Scalar Spatial Effects on Turnout

Differences among metropolitan regions comprise one of the main sources of variations in turnout, and help to account for significant part of the differences among nations. In nearly every country in this study, the analyses have affirmed that higher population density and larger size reduce turnout in elections (Table 5). Across the entire dataset, just as Preteceille (2000) found for France, larger metropolitan areas have lower voting rates. This effect is much stronger in municipal elections, where ties to a local community within the wider metropolis

[5] The scatter plots also reveal a variety of relationships between national and local turnout patterns, from the linear co-variation in Sweden (Pearson r=0.98), to the much more limited relationships in the United States (r = 0.50), Poland (r=0.109) and Israel (r = -0.009).

play a more crucial role in voter mobilisation.[6] Several other structural features of metropolitan areas also correlate intriguingly with local turnout rates (Table 5). Metro-level correlations suggest that a lower turnout gap (between national and local participation rates) is linked to geopolitical fragmentation and possibly population concentration. The Zeigler-Brunn index of geopolitical fragmentation correlates significantly with national turnout, but even more strongly with municipal turnout, and therefore with a smaller turnout gap.[7] Socio-spatial diversity and polarisation also correlate significantly enough to bolster the case that metropolitan structure has independent effects on turnout. Metropolitan variations also comprise an important source of the cross-national differences. Fully 48 per cent of the variation in metropolitan polarisation, 45 per cent of the variation in metropolitan population concentration, and 41 per cent of the variation in metropolitan geopolitical fragmentation occur between countries, rather than within them

Decades of electoral research have of course shown election turnout to be influenced by a broad range of variables beyond the macro-institutional setting and the metropolitan context (see Franklin 2004; Geys 2006). A full analysis of why communities vary in turnout must also take into account place-related variables describing the spatial contextual attributes of a community, as well as variables related to the motivation and resources of individual citizens to engage in the act of voting. To separate out these influences, analysis of the integrated dataset employed multi-level modelling techniques similar to those used in most of the country chapters.

Predicting Turnout in Local Elections

Participation in municipal elections is influenced by factors operating at all three scales of governance. According to a simple analysis of variance, the differences between countries that have traditionally been the focus of cross-national turnout comparisons leave 29 per cent of the variance unexplained. Since as much as 48 per cent of the variance between countries also corresponds to metropolitan and local variation, subnational effects are likely at work beyond what this initial figure suggests. At least 25 per cent of the overall variance occurs at the municipal/community scale, and at least six per cent at the metropolitan scale. The country chapters showed that municipal characteristics exert numerous influences on local election turnout, and account for an important part of the variation in municipal election turnout within countries.

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[6] A logged variable for metropolitan population correlates strongly (-0.409, $p<.01$) with lower turnout in municipal elections, but just short of significantly (-0.146, $p<.10$) with national election turnout. As the country analyses of the United States and France both found, the combined effect is an even stronger positive correlation with the gap between national and local electoral participation (0.474, $p<.01$).

[7] A related measure of total population concentration, the Herfindahl index, measures the overall population concentration among metropolitan municipalities. Although this index correlates weakly with either national or local turnout, it correlates significantly with a lower turnout gap. Although the correlation between this index and the Zeigler-Brunn Index is significant (0.407, $p<.01$), it remains low enough to permit independent effects from overall population concentration in some of the following models.

Table 5: Bivariate correlations of average local/municipal turnout with metropolitan structure

		National turnout (average)	Municipal turnout (average)	Turnout gap
Metropolitan population (log)		**-.146**	***-.409***	***.474***
	N	175	148	148
Metropolitan population concentration (Herfindahl index)		-.079	.054	**-.191**
	N	144	144	144
Metropolitan geopolitical fragmentation (Zeigler-Brunn index)		**.199**	***.329***	***-.261***
	N	155	147	147
Metropolitan sociospatial polarisation (three-category Simpson Index)		**-.125**	***-.539***	***.339***
	N	175	148	148
City-suburban polarisation (aggregated Nathan Adams index)		.083	**-.175**	***.480***
	N	141	121	121
Metropolitan affluence		.023	-.067	.063
	N	175	148	148

Notes: For boldface coefficients, p<.05; for boldface italicized coefficients, p<.01.

Multi-level regressions based on the pooled dataset enabled an encompassing test of national and metropolitan differences alongside others tested in the country chapters (Table 6). After tests of alternative hierarchical and non-hierarchical models, we settled on a set of three-level hierarchical models that incorporated effects at the municipal (level 1), the metropolitan (level 2), and the national levels (level 3). The models thus fitted included a linear model, a model with cross-level interactions, and a combined model.[8] Metropolitan effects, combined with dichotomous place variables for each of the different types of metropolitan municipalities/communities, accounted for 50-51 per cent of the local variance and 23 per cent of overall variance in turnout.

Certain structural and institutional features of metropolitan areas exert especially strong influences. The models point to a robust 'large is lively' effect (Kelleher and Lowery 2004). The more the population of a metropolitan area is concentrated in a small number of municipalities, the higher the turnout in local elections. Since the separate measure of metropolitan geopolitical fragmentation, the Zeigler and Brunn (1980) index, also raises municipal election turnout, the model provides simultaneous support for the countervailing 'small is beautiful' thesis. A significant cross-level variable in the full model shows that the latter effect concentrates strongly in countries with civic localist local government systems. These specific structural features of metropolitan areas overwhelmed influences from the other metropolitan variables that correlated with variations in turnout.

[8] At both the municipal and the metropolitan levels, the model included weights to correct for the different numbers of municipalities and metropolitan areas in the country samples. Final variables for each model were selected through backward regression.

Table 6: Multi-level regression analysis of municipal election turnout

	Linear model		Crosslevel effects		Combined model	
	B	t	B	t	B	t
Intercept	**74.34**	**4.37**	**80.02**	**4.67**	**88.86**	**9.09**
Country level variables						
Metropolitanisation	-0.13	-0.50	-0.13	-0.49		
Civic localism					**-55.62**	**-7.69**
Third wave democracies					-1.00	-0.45
Election day holiday					**-32.34**	**-3.75**
Ease of voting					**33.17**	**4.17**
Compulsory registration					**14.43**	**6.31**
Metropolitan and cross level variables						
Population concentration	**7.96**	**2.93**	**7.42**	**2.69**	**7.45**	**2.72**
Geopolitical fragmentation	**0.14**	**2.51**	**0.13**	**2.27**	*0.10*	*1.72*
Civic localism (country)					**0.76**	**2.51**
Sociospatial polarisation	*-4.77*	*-1.76*	*-4.85*	*-1.77*	-3.85	-1.42
Metropolitan population	-0.82	-0.84	-1.70	-1.61	-1.04	-0.98
Metropolitan affluence	-0.24	-0.17	-1.46	-0.98	-1.73	-1.18
Municipal and cross-level variables						
Urban concentrations	**2.23**	**3.45**	**-31.23**	**-4.29**	**-33.14**	**-4.43**
Herfindahl index (metropolitan)			**9.90**	**2.66**	**13.24**	**3.02**
Metropolitan population (metro)			**4.65**	**3.76**	**5.47**	**4.18**
Metropolitan affluence (metro)			**8.79**	**3.39**	**8.33**	**3.00**
Affluent suburbs	-0.50	-1.58	**-3.83**	**-4.38**	0.20	0.31
Civic localism (country)					**4.15**	**4.49**
Third wave democracies (country)					**1.51**	**2.59**
Compulsory registration (country)					**-1.84**	**-2.80**
Simpson index (metro)			**7.75**	**4.09**		
Low density suburbs	**0.61**	**1.98**	**0.62**	**1.99**	**0.72**	**2.32**
Muncipal population (log)	**-10.05**	**-33.55**	**-7.84**	**-13.00**	**-8.11**	**-12.30**
Zeigler-Brunn index (metro)			**-0.10**	**-3.45**	**-0.10**	**-3.30**
Metropolitan affluence (metro)			**-3.21**	**-3.30**	**-2.68**	**-2.43**
Poor nonminority suburbs	-0.30	-1.21	-0.37	-1.51	0.46	0.87
Metropolitan affluence (metro)					*-2.05*	*-1.74*
Poor minority suburbs	**-1.99**	**-3.14**	**-13.52**	**-5.24**	-0.39	-0.47
Metrpolitanisation (country)			**0.21**	**4.71**		
Zeigler-Brunn index (metro)					**-0.17**	**-2.18**
Log likelihood		-39192		-39159		-39132
Reliability: Level one		0.97		0.97		0.96
Level two		0.98		0.98		0.69
Variance explained						
Local		50%		51%		51%
Metropolitan		8%		9%		13%
National		15%		15%		97%
Total		23%		23%		82%
Deviance		78384		78318		78265
Estimated parameters		43		50		58
N		12162		12162		12162

Notes: Coefficients are full maximum likelihood estimates in HLM3 module of HLM.
For italicized coefficients, p<.10; for boldface coefficients, p<.05.

The multi-level models confirm important and consistent place effects from distinct types of suburban localities, even when national differences are taken into account. In all three models, the large negative effect from population size on municipal turnout overwhelms the other variables. Beyond this effect itself, municipal turnout is also consistently higher in low-density suburbs. Variables for cross-level interactions also show the effect from municipal size to depend partly on metropolitan structures. In more affluent and middle class metropolitan areas, and in those with higher levels of geopolitical fragmentation, smaller communities also have disproportionately higher turnout rates than elsewhere.

Each of these relationships extends beyond the United States, and beyond North America. Rather than products of a distinct national culture, they must be understood as global consequences of metropolitan settlement.

At the same time, many of the largest, most densely populated and most central metropolitan communities have more lively and engaging municipal elections. As the dichotomous variable for urban concentrations demonstrates, municipal turnout in these settings averages significantly higher than their size would predict. The models with cross-level interactions indicate that this effect is confined to particular metropolitan contexts. Municipal election turnout in metropolitan urban centres is higher where the metropolitan population is more concentrated, bigger and/or more affluent. Beyond these settings, turnout in urban centres is significantly lower than their size alone would dictate.

Among affluent suburbs, the models reveal a surprising exception to the greater mobilisation that has generally been found among affluent voters. As the French and Polish analyses observed, the lower turnout of this type of community in municipal elections suggests a disengagement from local politics that has not been noted before. Yet the effect is inconsistent, and there are caveats. The affluent suburbs of civic localist countries, third-wave democracies, and more divided metropolitan regions turn out more often to vote. And where compulsory national voter registration laws are present, the differential in turnout rates between affluent suburbs and other communities diminishes.

Among poor suburbs, the effects from class-related differences are also inconsistent. Poor minority suburbs turn out to vote consistently less than elsewhere (at least in the first two models).[9] Only in more affluent metropolitan areas does the same effect hold in poor nonminority suburbs.

Institutional factors account for much of the differences in spatial-contextual effects across communities. Variables that capture cross-national differences in institutions and politics raise the overall proportion of variance explained from 23 to 82 per cent. Although the small number of countries necessitates caution about making too many inferences from this result, we note that our sample includes a distribution of cases that span the range of institutional alternatives. Of these, the civic localism of the Anglo-American democracies and Switzerland exerts the strongest single direct effect. It produces unevenness in participation even as it depresses overall turnout, fostering higher participation in affluent suburbs but lower turnout in poor minority suburbs. Meanwhile, both ease of voting and compulsory registration raise turnout significantly, while interaction with other national-institutional variables produces a significant negative coefficient for the Election Day holiday.

Importantly, the full model with the national-institutional variables included serves to confirm the independence and significance of most effects at the metropolitan and local levels. Beyond what established sources of cross-national

[9] The addition of national institutional differences to the third model eliminates this effect, except for a significantly lower turnout rate among poor minority concentrations located in more fragmented metropolitan regions.

differences can explain, influences at these levels account for nearly a quarter of the overall variation in municipal turnout.

Predicting Participation in National Elections

As Figure 1 showed, turnout rates in national elections are generally higher, and in some countries much higher, than in municipal elections. Although many of the same contextual factors account for variations in national and municipal turnout, there are also important differences linked to metropolitan and local characteristics. The more mobilised electorate of national elections is generally more biased in favour of affluent and middle class municipalities and against more diverse, more polarised metropolitan areas. National levels of metropolitanisation also make a difference in promoting turnout in national elections that is not evident in municipal elections.

Metropolitan structure contributes in largely similar ways to national turnout as to municipal turnout, but with significant variations. Metropolitan population concentration fosters significantly higher voting rates, although the coefficients remain smaller and less significant than for municipal elections (Table 7). Polarisation among metropolitan communities depresses national turnout even more strongly than it does municipal turnout. However, the positive effects from intergovernmental fragmentation on municipal election turnout disappear altogether in national elections. The large size that results from concentrated population thus fosters liveliness less in national elections than in municipal ones. The smallness that follows from metropolitan jurisdictional fragmentation, whatever its beauty for municipal democracy, lacks any discernible influence on national electoral participation.[10]

At the level of local communities, the cross-country analysis of national participation rates identifies greater mobilisation among affluent and middle class communities than in municipal elections, on the one hand, and lower mobilisation among poor communities on the other. This is especially pronounced in civic localist countries, and those scoring low on Blais et al.'s (2003) ease of voting scale. This effect is furthermore linked to high levels of metropolitanisation and greater metropolitan size.

Unlike in municipal elections, moreover, both poor minority suburbs and poor nonminority suburbs experience significantly lower turnout rates. These communities are thus significantly under-represented in national electorates. For both types of disadvantaged communities, as the cross-level interactions demonstrate, these effects concentrate in civic localist countries, in larger metropolitan areas, and in countries with higher rates of metropolitanisation.

[10] It could be argued that the Zeigler-Brunn and Simpson indices measure a similar phenomenon that manifests itself at different scales of analysis. Thus municipal fragmentation, which is associated with socio-spatial polarisation among municipalities, has stronger effects at the municipal level, while polarisation among households more generally has stronger effects on national electoral participation.

Table 7: Multi-level regression analysis of national election turnout

	Linear model		Crosslevel effects		Combined model	
	B	t	B	t	B	t
Intercept	**49.14**	**3.56**	**47.88**	**3.47**	**101.58**	**10.93**
Country variables:						
Metropolitanisation	0.26	1.18	0.30	1.38		
Civic localism					**-46.95**	**-6.34**
Third wave democracies					-2.08	-0.90
Election day holiday					*-31.71*	*-3.25*
Ease of voting					*27.06*	*3.04*
Election day registration					**-21.76**	**-5.43**
Compulsory registration					-4.48	-1.69
Metropolitan level variables:						
Population concentration	**5.22**	**2.43**	3.59	1.58	**5.58**	**2.53**
Geopolitical fragmentation	-0.03	-0.72	0.05	0.91	0.02	0.30
Sociospatial polarisation	**-4.74**	**-2.17**	**-6.75**	**-2.97**	**-4.46**	**-1.98**
Metropolitan population (log)	1.07	1.32	1.12	1.32	0.52	0.61
Metropolitan affluence	1.60	1.39	0.28	0.22	0.38	0.31
Muncipal and cross-level variables:						
Urban concentrations	0.31	0.61	-0.31	-0.12	**-3.04**	**-3.35**
Metropolitanisation (country)			**-0.12**	**-3.09**		
Herfindahl index (metro)			**7.53**	**2.49**		
Simpson index (metro)			**8.10**	**2.73**		
Metropolitan affluence			**4.85**	**2.65**	**5.69**	**3.33**
Affluent suburbs	**1.40**	**4.39**	**-13.29**	**-3.52**	**2.97**	**6.14**
Metropolitanisation (country)			**0.05**	**2.01**		
Civic localism (country)					**8.31**	**12.23**
Ease of voting (country)					**-6.61**	**-4.69**
Metropolitan population (metro)			**2.09**	**3.23**		
Low density suburbs	**-1.26**	**-6.86**	**-16.89**	**-7.37**	**-10.13**	**-4.81**
Metropolitanisation (country)			**0.05**	**3.12**		
Election day holiday (country)					**-2.64**	**-4.67**
Herfindahl index (metro)			**3.79**	**2.95**	**3.53**	**2.82**
Zeigler-Brunn Index (metro)			**0.05**	**2.22**	**0.05**	**2.12**
Simpson index (metro)			**-2.53**	**-2.57**	**-2.25**	**-2.29**
Metropolitan population (metro)			**2.22**	**6.48**	**1.93**	**6.30**
Muncipal population (log)	**-3.02**	**-10.74**	**-2.32**	**-6.61**	**-2.97**	**-9.24**
Election day registration (country)					**7.25**	**9.30**
Zeigler-Brunn Index (metro)			**-0.13**	**-4.05**	**-0.08**	**-3.00**
Poor nonminority suburbs	**-1.68**	**-7.74**	**5.63**	**2.11**	**-1.45**	**-7.44**
Civic localism (country)					**-4.07**	**-6.46**
Metropolitan population (metro)			**-1.27**	**-2.79**		
Poor minority suburbs	**-2.73**	**-7.11**	7.26	1.66	3.51	0.93
Metropolitanisation (country)			**-0.06**	**-2.30**		
Civic localism (country)					**-3.83**	**-3.29**
Herfindahl index (metro)			5.74	1.61		
Metropolitan population (metro)			*-1.29*	*-1.77*	*-1.04*	*-1.67*
Log likelihood		-36308		-36257		-36186
Reliability: Level one		0.98		0.98		0.98
Level two		0.98		0.98		0.77
Variance explained						
Local		34%		34%		34%
Metropolitan		-22%		-10%		-8%
National		26%		26%		96%
Total		24%		26%		82%
Deviance		72617		72515		72371
Estimated parameters		43		59		61
N		12839		12839		12839

Notes: Coefficients are full maximum likelihood estimates in HLM3 module of HLM.
For italicized coefficients, p<.10; for boldface coefficients, p<.05.

Municipal size has similar effects in national elections as it does on municipal elections, albeit on a more limited scale. However, there is a clear difference

among low density suburbs. Distinguished in municipal elections by significantly higher turnout rates than elsewhere, these localities vote at significantly lower rates in national elections. This effect is especially pronounced in smaller, more polarised, less concentrated, and less geopolitically fragmented metropolitan areas, and in countries with lower levels of metropolitanisation.

With a few exceptions, the national-institutional influences on participation in national elections are more difficult to distinguish. However, there is a clear relationship with civic localism. This form of governance retains a significant association with lower overall national turnout, and with both higher rates in affluent suburbs and lower rates in poor and minority suburbs. Election-day registration has a negative relationship with national turnout as a result of multi-collinearity with other national-institutional influences, but a positive cross-level relationship with larger municipalities.

Finally, the significance of greater metropolitanisation at the national scale for national election turnout points to a more general relationship between metropolitanisation and national patterns of electoral mobilisation. Analyses of metropolitan political influence in the national policymaking process of the United States have convincingly demonstrated how the growing power of affluent and middle class suburbs over the twentieth century marginalised representatives from inner-city and disadvantaged communities (Mollenkopf 1983; Wolman and Marckini 1998). The results here suggest that these differentials in influence are a transnational consequence of metropolitanisation that is connected to differences in electoral mobilisation itself. Metropolitanisation raises national election turnout in affluent and low density suburbs, and lowers it in urban concentrations and poor minority suburbs. These effects may come about partly through differences in the influence of representatives from these types of places on electoral laws, policies and other institutions. The effects from national metropolitanisation are clearly collinear with effects from the national institutional differences tested in the full model, and disappear when the institutional variables are included.

Metropolitanisation at the national scale thus has systemic consequences for the mobilisation of different types of metropolitan communities. In the most metropolitanised polities, affluent, middle class and low density suburbs mobilise more effectively than others to maintain their predominant position in the metropolitan electorate. On top of the difficulties that municipal size and urban density create for mobilisation, urban concentrations and poor suburbs face a growing numerical disadvantage in the national electoral competition to influence public policy.

Metropolitanisation and Electoral Participation

The spread of metropolitan settlement has established systematic geographic variations in political participation. Predominant accounts of political nationalisation by Caramani (2004) have failed to recognise this complex reterritorialisation of politics. Older distinctions between urban and rural

settlement, or between discrete territorial regions between countries, cannot capture the main lines of the resulting divisions within and between metropolitan areas. Numerous consequences from metropolitanisation, including increasingly uneven electoral participation in larger cities and divided, dispersed metropolitan regions, have undoubtedly contributed to the declining overall turnout levels in developed democracies over the last decades (Fuchs and Klingemann 1995). As the multilevel analysis of turnout has shown, a simple transnational typology of local places and metropolitan characteristics captures a remarkable proportion of the cross-national local variation.

A final question concerns the degree to which turnout patterns are simply a result of the social composition of an electorate who happens to live in distinct types of places, rather than consequences from the characteristics of places themselves. While the demographic composition of municipalities remains a major predictor of turnout rates, and in national elections can account for most of the explained variation in participation (Table 7), the fine-grained analyses of the country chapters in Sellers et al. (2013) confirm that it is indeed features of the local and metropolitan spatial contexts that make much of the difference (Table 8). They frequently predict municipal turnout better than demographic composition does, and provide alternative accounts to socioeconomic characteristics for a further proportion of the variation. The country chapters confirm a variety of specific spatial effects:

- The negative effect of population size and/or population density on election turnout stands out as an overall result. In every country, turnout in at least one type of election falls with the population size or population density of a municipality. In eight of eleven countries, this relationship holds for both national and local elections. The independent effects of population size and density alongside each other, where both are available and significant, confirm a clear 'small is beautiful' effect.
- In every European and North American democracy where homeownership was tested, it exerts a positive effect on turnout in elections at one or both levels beyond the effects of demographic composition.
- In four of the six countries where occupational diversity was tested, it had negative effects on turnout in elections at one or both levels. More economically homogenous communities generally turn out to vote more.
- The presence of commuters has diverse effects on turnout rates that are related to national differences in the social geography of cities. For example, in the U.S. and Sweden, the effect in local elections is negative whereas in both local and national elections of France and Spain, and in national elections in Germany, commuting is a significant predictor of higher turnout. The research from Canada suggests these differences derive partly from the way that social class interacts with the automobile dependence of places.

Table 8: Influences on local/municipal level turnout in local and national elections, overview of country results

	Israel		Germany		USA		UK		Canada		Spain		France		Poland		Switzerland		Sweden		Czech Rep.	
Metropolitanisation	100%		83%		78%		76%		64%		54%		52%		42%		40%		32%		28%	
	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat
Compositional variables at municipal level																						
Socio-economic status	-	(+)	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	0	(+)	+	+	+	0	0	0	+	+	+	(-)	+
Hardship index	n.a.	n.a.	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	-	-	0	-	n.a.	n.a.	(-)	-
Foreign born residents	n.a.	0	0	-	0	0	(+)	+	0	0	-	(-)	-	-	n.a.	n.a.	0	-	-	-	0	0
Old residents	(-)	0	+	0	+	+	0	+	0	0	+	+	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	0	+	+	0	(+)	+
Young residents	(+)	(+)	+	0	n.a.	n.a.	+	+	0	0	+	+	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0	+	+	0	(+)	0
Contextual variables at municipal level																						
Homeownership	n.a.	0	n.a.	n.a.	+	+	0	+	0	+	n.a.	n.a.	+	+	n.a.	n.a.	+	(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)	0
Residential stability	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a	0	+	0	(-)	0	0	n.a.	n.a	-	-	+	+	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Out-commuting	n.a.	n.a.	0	+	(-)	0	0	0	(-)	0	-	0	+	+	n.a.	n.a.	-	-	0	0	n.a.	n.a.
Electoral competition	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	+	+	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-	-	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Population size	-	-	-	-	-	-	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	0	-	(-)
Population density	(-)	0	-	0	0	(+)	0	-	-	0	0	(-)	-	-	-	0	0	+	0	0	n.a.	n.a.
Economic diversity	n.a.	n.a.	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	0	+	(+)	-	+	n.a.	n.a.	0	+	n.a.	n.a.	0	0

Notes: + = significant positive relation to turnout; - = significant negative relation to turnout; 0 = no significant relation to turnout; n.a. = relation not tested in country study. Parentheses indicate significance in some but not all models.

- The presence of commuters has diverse effects on turnout rates that are related to national differences in the social geography of cities. For example, in the U.S. and Sweden, the effect in local elections is negative whereas in both local and national elections of France and Spain, and in national elections in Germany, commuting is a significant predictor of higher turnout. The research from Canada suggests these differences derive partly from the way that social class interacts with the automobile dependence of places.
- Residential stability had a positive influence on election turnout in the United States and Poland, but negative effects in the United Kingdom and France. Its effects were generally more positive at the municipal level than at the national level.
- Electoral competition likewise has diverse effects on participation. For example, it has a positive effect in the United States but negative in France.

Not only do these attributes of place matter, but the arrangement and structure of metropolitan areas make a large difference. For electoral participation in a metropolitan municipality, it matters whether that municipality is located in a metropolitan area in which the population is concentrated or dispersed, whether the institutional configuration is fragmented or consolidated, whether the socio-economic pattern is homogenous or diverse, whether the metropolitan area is large or small, and whether it is affluent or not. Thus, metropolitanisation complicates the local 'small is beautiful' and other localised place effects on municipal election turnout with a variety of countervailing and reinforcing effects at intermediate scales.

Taken together, the results of the country studies and the pooled analysis provide compelling confirmatory evidence for metropolitanisation as an important source of variations in national and local political participation, and the pervasive gap between them. Beyond this turnout gap itself, the analysis has also revealed partly divergent ecological dynamics in national and local elections. Especially in local elections, but to an important and overlooked degree in national elections as well, features of metropolitan places themselves are critical to these dynamics. The continued expansion of metropolitan regions compounds and gives growing weight to the processes this analysis has revealed. The persistent divergences in turnout between metropolitan places ultimately skew patterns of competition between the parties these places support.

Metropolitanisation and Partisanship

Metropolitanisation has also transformed the geographic sources of partisan loyalties, and in turn national strategies of partisan competition. In doing so, it has altered the nationalisation of partisan competition that took place with the decline of regionally distinct party systems over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Place-based partisan divergences that first emerged within large established metropolises are becoming mirrored in other metropolitan areas

throughout national territories (Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers 2005). Where similar contrasts within metropolitan areas have emerged in regions with traditionally distinct partisan affiliations, the resulting regional convergence may seem to bring about a degree of nationalisation. Far from a disappearance of territory in national politics, however, metropolitan political divides represent a new, embedded source of territorial cleavages that are increasingly central to partisan competition.

Table 9: Levels of territorial heterogeneity of party support in metropolitan municipalities/communities across eleven countries (national elections)

	Country	Year(s) of election	Cumulative S.D.	Overall S.D., 1990s (Caramani 2004)	IPR (weighted summary)	Overall weighted IPR, 1990s (Caramani 2004)	PSNS	Overall PSNS, 1980s and 1990s (Jones and Mainwaring 2003)
Nationalised	United States	1996-2004	26.0		0.32		0.86	0.84
	Sweden	1998-2002	31.3	22.3	0.34	0.29	0.84	
	Germany	1998-2002	33.0	55.1	0.34	0.40	0.82	
	West		*21.0*		*0.28*		*0.89*	
	East		*26.1*		*0.32*		*0.86*	
	Czech Republic	1996-2002	42.3		0.39		0.78	
	France	2001	43.1	34.2	0.39	0.32	0.77	
Territorialised	U.K. (England, Wales)	2001	49.2	53.9	0.40	0.44	0.77	
	Poland	1993-2001	59.8		0.46		0.71	
	Spain	1996-2004	62.1	57.6	0.48	0.37	0.68	
	Switzerland	1999-2003	68.7	102	0.49	0.58	0.67	
	Canada	2006	68.9		0.51		0.66	0.72
	Israel	1999-2003	110.8		0.64		0.48	

Notes: PSNS = Party System Nationalization Score (U.S. score from Jones and Mainwaring (2003) and IPR for France from Caramani (2004) based on Lower Chamber legislative elections, rather than Presidential elections used for IMO dataset. Metropolitan figures calculated by legislative districts in the U.K. and Canada, by municipal units in all other countries.

Research on the nationalisation of party systems has devised a number of metrics to compare the territorial homogeneity of electoral support for political parties among countries and over time (Table 9).[11] Applied to measure the territorial

[11] The IPR index (Caramani 2005: 300), already used to measure heterogeneity in turnout, is based on the differences between the share of the votes for each party in the municipality, weighted by the number and size of municipalities. The IPR varies between a minimum of zero, signifying a perfectly homogenous distribution of partisan support, and one, indicating territorially distinct concentrations of support for different parties. The cumulative standard deviation for party support is a measure of the dispersion of support of individual parties across municipalities within countries. The higher the figure, the higher territorial heterogeneity of party support (Caramani 2005: 321). Similarly, the so-called Party System Nationalisation Score (PSNS) (Jones and Mainwaring 2003: 143) is based on the Gini coefficient and measures the equality of

homogeneity of party support among the metropolitan municipalities in each country, these measures correspond remarkably closely to national differences found in the literature on party system nationalisation. Caramani's cut-point for distinguishing nationalised from 'regionalised' or more territorialized systems[12] yields five countries in the first category and six in the second. For the three clearly nationalised countries with comparative metrics (the United States, Sweden and France), the indicators show slightly greater territorial heterogeneity among metropolitan localities than among national legislative districts. For most countries with major regional partisan differences, notably Switzerland, the U.K., Germany and Canada, the overall metropolitan variation is less pronounced than that among national legislative districts. German metropolitan patterns proved sufficiently homogenous to move that country into the Nationalised category. Especially there and in Switzerland, metropolitan divisions have overlaid regional ones with elements of cross-regional standardisation. In countries with less stark historical regional divisions, metropolitan divisions appear to capture and even accentuate the overall levels of national territorial heterogeneity.[13]

Measures likes these from the nationalisation literature provide no way of sorting out territorial heterogeneity at the metropolitan and local scales from other variation. As noted in the introduction to this volume, it is also important to understand how much of the variation in partisanship occurs within as well as between metropolitan areas (see Table 1.2 in the introduction). Comparison of the variance within and between metropolitan areas in the left-right partisanship index of the metropolitan dataset (see infra) demonstrates the pervasive role of local variation in the overall patterns (Figure 4). Although the eleven nations in our study display quite different mixes of regional and local variation, significant territorial variations are present in all of them. Most striking is the absence of purely regional heterogeneity. Among countries with high regional variation, such as Canada, Spain and Switzerland, the variations are instead multi-scalar. Partisan heterogeneity within the metropolitan areas of these countries ranges higher than in most of the other cases. Within Israel, the country with the greatest territorial variation, the largest component of that variation occurs within metropolitan areas.

The country chapters have already shown many of the ways patterns of party support differ systematically across metropolitan communities. This metropolitan heterogeneity has added new layers of complexity to previous patterns of political regionalism. In some cases metropolitanisation has worked

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the share of votes for each party across municipalities, weighted by the overall size of each party. The PSNS varies from a minimum of zero, indicating perfectly unequal party support across municipalities, to a maximum of one, indicating perfectly equal party support across municipalities. The specific strengths and weaknesses of each of these indicators have been discussed elsewhere (Caramani 2005).

[12] Since the metrics measure overall territorial heterogeneity, including subregional variation, it is misleading to employ 'regionalised' as the opposite of 'nationalised' (Carmani 2005: 300). Table 9 adapts Caramani's categories accordingly.

[13] Caramani also classified Switzerland into a separate group of highly regionalised countries (Caramani 2004: 93). However, the metrics he reports for that country in the 1990s (Caramani 2004: 89), reflected in Table 9, do not place it in that category.

to reduce the importance of regionalism. In others the interaction between the two has fostered new political allegiances and party relationships. If metropolitanisation has levelled some regional variations, it has reinforced others. It has entrenched new territorial divides and lines of partisan competition among communities and sub-cultures within metropolitan areas. Often, the metropolitan places with the most opposed partisan loyalties are located only a few minutes apart from each other. In all these respects, metropolitanisation has given rise to new forms of territorialisation.

Figure 4: Change in the level of local and metropolitan variation in partisanship over time



Note: Variance reflects the decomposed variance as determined through ANOVA. Years of elections: Canada (1981, 2006); Czech Republic (1996, 2002); France (2002); Germany (1998, 2002); Israel (1999, 2003); Poland (1993, 2001); Spain (1996, 2004); Sweden (1998, 2002); Switzerland (1999, 2003); UK (1992, 2001); USA (1996, 2004).

Metropolitan patterns of party support: From Nationalisation to Metropolitanisation?

As in the analysis of turnout, cross-national comparison requires that local and metropolitan patterns of partisanship be considered against the backdrop of national political competition and other variations among countries. Parties can be interpreted as competing in a political marketplace for votes (Kitschelt 1994). The choices voters make remain constrained by the positions and candidates that the parties choose to offer. Increasingly, metropolitanisation has shaped this dual logic of partisan competition. Each of the main party families in developed and transitional democracies has found strongholds of support in specific types of metropolitan places. Despite the large differences between national party systems, a consistent metropolitan political ecology comprises part of the genealogical make-up of each party family.[14]

The eleven countries of the dataset encompass a wide variety of national party systems, and reflect diverse national trends in contemporary electoral competition. The cross-sectional variations exemplify how the fortunes of different parties have fluctuated over time. The sample includes countries with, at the time of study, left overall majorities at the national level (Sweden, Germany, the UK and Poland), one country with a mixed left majority (the Czech Republic), one country with a mixed right majority (Switzerland), three countries with a right majority (France, Spain and Israel), and two countries (Canada and the United States) where the majority shifted from centre-left to right over the period under study.

Table 10: Voter support for parties, grouped by party families and ideological issue position indices (standardised by countries) in metropolitan municipalities: proportions of variance between countries, metropolitan areas and municipalities (ANOVA)

Voter support	*Percentage of variance between …*		
	Countries	Metropolitan areas	Municipalities/ Communities
Far left parties (6/11 countries)	47%	14%	39%
Green parties (8/11 countries)	39%	14%	47%
Center left parties (11/11 countries)	62%	12%	26%
Center right parties (11/11 countries)	52%	19%	28%
Market liberal parties (10/11 countries)	73%	10%	17%
Far right parties (5/11 countries)	25%	31%	44%
Regionalist and ethnic parties (3/11 countries)	15%	55%	30%

Because of the distinctive origins and historical trajectories of national party systems, it should come as no surprise that the largest proportion of the variance in community support for most types of parties in our sample is explained by differences between countries (Table 10). The analysis of variance leaves equally little question, however, about the importance of variations within and between

[14] Definitions of party families follow the classification scheme in Kriesi et al. (2008). See Table A1 in the appendix to this chapter.

metropolitan areas. Indeed, for parties of the far Left, and parties of the far Right, as well as 'Green' parties, regionalist and ethnic parties, support varies more at the subnational level than between countries. For any type of party except for regionalist and ethnic parties, local differences within metropolitan areas comprise the greatest source of subnational variation. These municipal-level differences make up between 17 per cent and 47 per cent of the overall variance. While local variations are especially decisive for the far Left, the far Right and the Greens, they still represent over a quarter of the overall variance in support for the Centre Left and Centre Right, and about thirty per cent of the variance in regionalist and ethnic party support.

Table 11: Significant predictors of party voting in metropolitan municipalities/communities, by party family

	Far Left	Greens	Moderate Left	Market Liberal	Moderat e Right	Far Right
Metropolitan effects						
Airport passengers/year (metro)	-		(-)	+		
Metropolitan population (metro)			**+**		(-)	
Metropolitan affluence (metro)		**+**	**-**			
Metropolitan polarisation (metro)					-	
Poor nonminority concentrations (metro)	**+**					**+**
Poor minority concentrations (metro)						**+**
Municipal effects						
Urban concentrations	**(-)**	**(+)**				**(-)**
Affluent suburbs	**-**	**+**	**-**	(+)	**+**	(-)
Low density suburbs		**-**	-	**-**	**(+)**	
Municipal population (log)	**+**		**+**		**(-)**	
Poor nonminority suburbs	**+**	**-**	**+**	**-**	**-**	+
Poor minority suburbs	**+**	**-**	**(+)**	**(-)**	**-**	**(+)**
Maximum variance explained						
Local	17%	8%	35%	31%	35%	31%
Overall	48%	19%	49%	35%	18%	45%

Note: Positive and negative signs represent direction of significant direct effects. Parentheses indicate significance in linear but not full equations. Boldface indicates p<.01; otherwise p<.05.

Analysis of the metropolitan and local influences on the performance of party families reveals a clear relationship between each type of party and specific types of metropolitan places (Table 11).[15] The most consistent bases of metropolitan

[15] As in the analysis of voter turnout, a series of three-level regression models compared the effects of variables at national, metropolitan influences on the performance of each type of party family in those countries where it had established a national presence. The regressions for each party began with linear baseline models, followed by models that incorporated cross-level influences selected through backwards regressions. Although small samples of countries limited the reliability of inferences at the country level, the models included controls for dominance of the

support appear among the long established parties of the moderate Left and the far Left. Moderate Left parties rely on support from larger communities, poor suburbs and larger metropolitan areas in general. They perform consistently less well in affluent and low-density suburbs. In more affluent metropolitan areas as well as those with stronger relations to the global economy, support for the moderate Left has lagged.

The smaller far Left parties have also performed better in poorer and more urbanised communities, but their profile most closely follows patterns of economic disadvantage. Poorer metropolitan areas with fewer minorities, as well as metropolitan areas less integrated into the global economy, generally provide stronger support for the far Left. At the local level, support for these parties has concentrated in poorer, more densely populated communities, and outside affluent suburbs and metropolitan urban centres.

The newer family of Green parties, born of post-industrial cleavages that first emerged in the 1970s, has grown to occupy a distinctive metropolitan niche. Although largely an urban party like their counterparts on the Left, with little basis of support in low density suburbs, the Greens have thrived most in centres of educational and administrative services and high tech employment (Sellers 1998). They have received much of their support from urban centres, especially the cores of the largest metropolitan areas, and in affluent suburbs only occasionally won by the moderate Left. They have also won a larger share of the vote in metropolitan areas with larger proportions of affluent and middle class communities, where the moderate Left has consistently underperformed.

On the Right, there are fairly consistent metropolitan patterns of support. Moderate Right and Market Liberal parties, which have been the greatest proponents of neoliberal policies, rely most consistently on affluent suburbs for support. Both are least likely to receive support from poor suburbs. There and in less diverse, less polarised metropolitan areas, moderate Right parties have performed worst. They have also underperformed in more populous localities and metropolitan areas. While low-density suburbs are more likely to vote for Moderate Right parties, they are less likely to vote for Market Liberals. The latter gather more of the vote among the more urbanised constituencies and in more globally connected metropolitan areas.

Meanwhile, recently established far Right parties like the National Front of France, the Swiss People's Party or the Swedish Democrats have built support around nationalist and often ethnocentric agendas. These appeals have gained the strongest support in communities and metropolitan areas with more marginal positions in the global economy. Support for the far Right concentrates among poor suburbs, especially those with fewer minorities, and is generally stronger among metropolitan areas with larger concentrations of these poor suburbs. It is significantly lower in urban centres as well as in affluent suburbs.

Left or the Right in national elections, and for postcommunist or transitional democracies. Additional variables controlled for the local performance of other competing parties on the Left or the Right.

Metropolitan sources of left-right voting

The overall consequences of metropolitan political divisions can be gauged more systematically by means of the partisan ideological indices constructed in each country for each metropolitan locality. These indices employed partisan voting and the ideological preferences expressed by supporters for each party in national surveys to estimate the ideological 'centre of gravity' for each locality in the study (Gross and Sigelman 1984).

Figure 5: Party support in metropolitan communities of eleven countries, measured by party voters' left-right self-placement, by types of municipalities (mean values and 95% confidence intervals)



First, an index based on the self-placement of voters for each of the parties in contemporaneous surveys enabled an analysis of where each locality stands on the left right spectrum. Second, three additional ideological indices were constructed using the issue positions of party voters on a pre-defined range of issues: 1) political-economic (state-centred vs. market-centred economic policies), 2) socio-cultural (cultural conservatism vs. social liberalism), and 3) globalisation and cosmopolitanism (openness to immigration and trade, vs. nationalism and ethnocentrism).[16] These indices provide a more in-depth analysis of the distinct dimensions of partisanship and ideology.

[16] The procedure for defining these ideological indices is described in the country chapters of Sellers et al. (2013) and summarised in the methodological appendix to this paper. Positive coefficients in these models for each index indicate a more conservative position, and negative coefficients greater support for the Left. As we are more interested in variation between

Analysis of voter self-placement on the standard left-right scale highlights many of the most important general findings from the country studies (Figure 5). Across the whole range of countries, distinct partisan cleavages are articulated among different types of metropolitan places. Regardless of the electoral outcome, urban centres and poor minority suburbs give stronger support to the Left than do other suburban places. In each country, the affluent and low-density suburbs harbour the strongest support for the Right. Middle class suburbs stand between these other types. They have consistently voted more for the Right than the urban concentrations, but more for the Left than either the low density or the affluent suburbs.

Multi-level analysis of the full dataset generally confirms these patterns (Table 12). A variable for the log of population demonstrates a strong, consistent relationship between size and Left support, as does the dichotomous variable for poor minority suburbs. Affluent suburbs clearly maintain consistent bases of support for the Right.[17]

The multilevel analysis also reveals a number of significant predictors at wider scales. Greater integration of a metropolitan area into the global capitalist economy, measured here by the number of airport passengers[18], generally works to the advantage of the Right (see model 1). As the model with cross-level interaction terms (Model 2) shows, this effect also varies by type of locality. Larger metropolitan localities in more globalised metropolitan settings vote significantly less strongly for the Left. Low-density suburbs there give less support to the Right.

A second set of multilevel influences stem from metropolitan settlement structures. Larger metropolitan areas and countries with more metropolitan patterns of settlement have experienced deeper ideological divides among different types of metropolitan communities. Larger metropolitan areas generally provide greater support for the Left. Poor minority suburbs in these settings give the Left even stronger support, while low-density suburbs there align more strongly with the Right.

Greater ethnic and income diversity at the metropolitan scale may mitigate the consequences of the deepening divides that metropolitanisation generally brings. Socio-spatial polarisation in a metropolitan area, a contextual feature related to aggregate ethnic and socio-economic diversity, exerts contrasting effects to those of other metropolitan variables. Low-density suburbs in spatially polarised settings give less support to the Right, while the Leftist orientation in poor suburbs stands out less.

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municipalities and metropolitan areas, rather than countries, all four indices have been standardised at the country level, thereby setting the variance between countries to zero.

[17] In models without the variable for size, urban concentrations emerged as a significant predictor of voting for the Left and low density suburbs as a predictor of voting for the Right.

[18] Alternative measures for the number of international passengers, the volume of freight, and the volume of international freight generated similar results.

Table 12: Multi-level regression analysis of party support in metro-politan municipalities (left-right self-placement index and economic index)

	Party self-placement		(Crosslevel effects)		Economic index		(Crosslevel effects)	
	B	t	B	t	B	t	B	t
Intercept	1.14	1.31	0.44	0.49	0,06	0,07	0,34	0,42
Metropolitan effects								
Sociospatial polarisation (metro)	0.10	0.27	-0.02	-0.07	-0,25	-0,75	-0,38	-1,16
Airport passengers/year (metro)	**0.07**	**2.86**	**0.06**	**2.50**	**0,07**	**3,32**	**0,07**	**3,17**
Metropolitan population (metro)	**-0.33**	**-1.98**	-0.21	-1.20	-0,18	-1,25	-0,25	-1,61
Metropolitan affluence (metro)	0.24	1.08	0.26	1.16	**0,73**	**3,66**	**0,80**	**4,02**
Municipal and crosslevel effects								
Urban concentrations	-0.16	-1.10	-0.14	-1.02	-0,02	-0,11	**3,02**	**4,05**
Metropolitanisation (country)							**-0,01**	**-2,29**
Metropolitan population (metro)							**-0,36**	**-2,94**
Affluent suburbs	**0.28**	**4.67**	**0.32**	**6.51**	**0,51**	**5,65**	-0,66	-1,50
Right wins (country)							**0,40**	**4,87**
Postcommunist (country)			**-0.30**	**-2.23**				
Metropolitan population (metro)							**0,21**	**2,96**
Metropolitan affluence (metro)							**-0,36**	**-1,93**
Low density suburbs	0.09	0.99	-0.78	-2.20	0,05	0,56	**-1,13**	**-3,04**
Postcommunist (country)			**-0.52**	**-4.05**				
Metropolitanisation (country)			**0.01**	**2.31**			**0,01**	**3,50**
Metropolitan polarisation (metro)			**-0.39**	**-1.95**			**-0,54**	**-2,98**
Airport passengers/year (metro)			**-0.02**	**-2.03**				
Metropolitan population (metro)			**0.14**	**2.07**			0,12	1,90
Municipal population (log)	**-0.23**	**-6.35**	0.65	1.77	-0,14	-1,54	-0,24	-2,09
Metropolitan polarisation (metro)			**0.35**	**1.97**				
Airport passengers/year (metro)			**0.03**	**2.51**			**0,03**	**2,45**
Metropolitan population (metro)			**-0.20**	**-2.86**				
Poor nonminority suburbs	-0.09	-1.62	**-0.98**	**-4.37**	-0,21	-4,73	0,59	1,14
Right wins (country)			**0.37**	**4.23**				
Metropolitanization (country)			**0.01**	**2.52**			**0,01**	**2,29**
Metropolitan polarisation (metro)			**0.76**	**2.88**				
Airport passengers/year (metro)							**0,05**	**3,37**
Metropolitan population (metro)							**-0,25**	**-2,56**
Poor nonminority concentrations (metro)			**-0.63**	**-3.65**				
Poor minority suburbs	**-0.56**	**-3.00**	**4.15**	**7.98**	**-0,38**	**-3,47**	**2,46**	**3,57**
Metropolitanisation (country)			**-0.03**	**-5.77**				
Metropolitan polarisation (metro)			**1.01**	**1.94**				
Metropolitan population (metro)			**-0.48**	**-5.65**			**-0,46**	**-4,12**
Log likelihood		-14438		-14365		-14736		-14708
Reliability: Level one		0.98		0.98		0.97		0.97
Level two		0.00		0.01		0.04		0.04
Variance explained								
Local		18%		19%		21%		21%
Metropolitan		3%		5%		14%		15%
Total		12%		13%		19%		19%
Deviance		28876		28731		29472		29415
Estimated parameters		42		88		42		85
N		12843		12843		12797		12797

Note: Coefficients are full maximum likelihood estimates in HLM3 module of HLM.
For italicized coefficients, p<.10; for boldface coefficients, p<.05.
Due to the standardisation of the dependent variable around the mean for each country, linear country variables were insignificant and are not shown here.

Alongside these metropolitan influences, the multivariate tests of the country chapters in Sellers et al. (2013) reveal an array of local effects. These patterns represent far more than a reflection of the social and economic composition of these places (Table 13), and differ substantially between older and younger capitalist democracies. In Western Europe and North America, where

metropolitanisation is most advanced, population density emerges as one of the most consistent predictors of voting for the Left. Homeownership also exerts clear, consistent effects. In every country where this variable was tested except for Israel, where distinct historical conditions apply, communities with more homeowners gave significantly greater support to the Right.

Table 13: Significant predictors of voter self-placement in metropolitan municipalities/communities, by country: overview from country

	USA	Canada	UK	France	Switzerland	Germany	Spain	Sweden	Poland	Czech Rep.	Israel
Winning parties in study period	Mixed	Mixed/ Right	Left	Right	Mixed	Left	Mixed	Left	Left	Mixed/ Right	Right/ Centre
Compositional variables at local-community level											
Socio-economic status	+	+	+	+ (income) - (educ.)	(+)	-	+	+	0	+	-
Hardship index	-	0	-	0	0	0	-	n.a.	-	-	n.a.
Foreign born residents	-	0	0	(+)	+	0	+	0	n.a.	0	0
Old residents	0	(+)	+	+	0	0	+	0	n.a.	(+)	0
Young residents	n.a.	0	+	n.a.	0	+	0	0	n.a.	(+)	-
Contextual variables at local-community level											
Homeowner-ship	+	0	+	+	+	n.a.	n.a.	+	n.a.	+	0
Residential stability	-	(-)	(-)	-	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-	n.a.	n.a.
Out-commuting	(-)	(-)	n.a.	-	0	0	-	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Population size	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-	0	-	0	+	+	-
Population density	-	(-)	-	-	0	-	0	0	0	n.a.	0
Economic diversity	+	0	0	0	0	0	-	n.a.	n.a.	0	n.a.

Notes: + = positive relation to right self-placement; - = positive relation to left self-placement; 0 = no significant relation to left-right self-placement; n.a. = relation not tested in country study. Parentheses indicate significance in some but not all models.

Wherever metropolitanisation has absorbed the majority of the electorate into extended urban regions, distinct spatial cleavages have emerged. The Right has drawn new support from voters with interests and orientations rooted in suburban localities of homeowners, low density settlement, concentrated privilege, and links to the international marketplace. These are the metropolitan bastions of neoliberalism within the contemporary capitalist city. In eight of the eleven countries, communities with higher overall socio-economic status or income vote

more for the Right. In seven of eleven, communities containing more seniors also disproportionately support the Right.

In contrast, the Left has drawn support from both larger urbanised places and those with more renters, smaller families and more young adults. Although socio-economic composition often proves multicollinear with contextual differences, it remains a major source of the intra-metropolitan variation. Minority or immigrant concentrations vote Left with some degree of consistency (in eight of the eleven countries), and in every country except Germany, communities with greater socio-economic hardship vote significantly more to the Left (Table 13).

Patterns in the two newer democracies of post-communist Europe, the Czech Republic and Poland, differ from those in the other countries. In these countries, population density (and city size) predicts stronger support for the Right rather than the Left. State socialism there long prevented the emergence of housing markets outside the urban centres. As a result, metropolitanisation and suburban low-density settlement remain more limited than in older capitalist democracies. Within both party systems, legacies from the postcommunist transition have also produced a distinctive relationship between the economic and other dimensions of partisan ideology (Kreuzer and Pattai 2004). The resulting menu of partisan choices has enabled Czech and Polish cities to embrace marketisation, cultural liberalism and cosmopolitanism at the same time.

Metropolitan influences on the dimensions of partisanship

As much of the literature on partisan competition since the 1970s in Western Europe has demonstrated, political parties no longer position themselves solely in relation to a unidimensional left-right scale. Increasingly, cultural issues (Kitschelt 1994) and questions related to globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi et al. 2008) now supplement longstanding economic questions about the relations between state and market as the defining issues in elections. For societies outside the developed West, the multidimensional character of partisan competition has been even more evident (Kreuzer and Pattai 2004). Three indices reveal how the partisan preferences of voters reflect positions on major dimensions of ideology (Figure 6; see methodological appendix to this volume for more details). The economic index captures issues directly linked to policy regarding the state and markets, including distributive questions about the welfare state. The socio-cultural index derives from questions about domestic cultural issues, such as religion, gender and familial authority. The globalisation index encompasses a broad range of issues linked to the general difference between cosmopolitanism and ethno-nationalism. Although items in this last index overlap with cultural and economic issues, the index focuses solely on matters that are international in scope or that concern immigration and racial diversity.[19]

[19] As the indexes for different countries have in some instances employed different survey questions, comparison of the results requires caution about setting index values for each country

Figure 6: Party support in metropolitan communities of eleven countries, measured by party voter's position on issues related to economic policies, globalisation, as well as cultural issues by type of municipalities (issue indices standardised by country, mean values and 95% confidence intervals)



Notes: ♦ Economic index, ■ Cultural index, ▲ Globalisation index

The dimension of economic ideology

One of the most direct ways that metropolitanisation has created new bases of support for neoliberalism stems from economic interests in assets and consumption patterns linked to the places where metropolitan residents live (Sellers and Walks 2013). In densely populated urban settings, as in the traditional industrial city, economies of scale and proximity as well as limited property assets give residents more reason to support the collective provision of services by the welfare state. Suburban communities, by contrast, depend more on private property and individualised modes of service provision. As a result, residents of these communities look more to the markets and private solutions that are a hallmark of neoliberal ideology. Affluent or middle class and lower-density suburban communities with more property assets, fewer opportunities for collective provision, and greater capacities for purchasing private services should be more prone toward neoliberal economic orientations (Dunleavy 1979; Walks 2006).

The index based on the economic ideology of party voters offers a calibrated test of these effects. As the discussion in the country chapters of

directly alongside each other. For this reason, the pooled analysis again centres the sub-national variation in each index around the national mean values.

Sellers et al. (2013) has shown, this index captures widespread opposition between support for markets and support for the welfare state. The typology of metropolitan localities provides a general view of the ways that similar types of municipalities compare in different countries (Figure 6). Multilevel analysis enables us to test the patterns systematically, and to compare variance in the economic index with the overall variations in voter self-placement on the left-right scale (Table 12, models 3 and 4).

The hypotheses about pro market orientations apply most clearly to affluent and middle class suburbs. As measured by the beta coefficients, affluent suburbs support pro-market parties nearly twice as strongly as they identify with the Right on the ideological scale. Beyond this, the more affluent and middle class suburbs dominate a metropolitan area, the stronger the average metropolitan support for market-friendly policies and parties. In accordance with expectations about the effects from increasing metropolitanisation, support for pro-market parties among affluent suburbs is especially pronounced in larger metropolitan areas. Where parties of the Right have consistently won, moreover, these parties have performed especially well in the affluent suburbs.[20]

The multilevel models also largely confirm the findings of numerous country chapters in Sellers et al. (2013) that support for welfare-statist parties concentrates in the urban centres that also usually serve as centres of metropolitan public service provision. The effect attains statistical significance in larger metropolitan areas and in countries with higher rates of metropolitanisation. Everywhere but in Poland, the Czech Republic and Israel, urban centres vote more strongly for welfare-statist parties than the metropolitan average. In the U.S., Canada and Switzerland, urban centres give stronger average support to pro-welfare state parties than do poor suburbs.

In mature developed economies, more sprawling metropolitan settlement clearly contributes to political support for neoliberal parties. The higher the national level of metropolitanisation, the more low-density suburbs vote for these parties. Smaller metropolitan municipalities also disproportionately support pro-market parties, once effects from global connectivity are controlled for. The country chapters show these effects to operate independently of the consequences from socioeconomic status, and to go beyond the occupational interests that have preoccupied theories of nationalisation and modernisation. In metropolitanised countries, numerous contextual variables linked to suburban lifestyles also predict stronger support for neoliberal policies:

- Homeownership or single family houses (in France, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States);
- Lower density or population size (in France, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States);
- Housing or population growth (in Canada, Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States);

[20] In an intriguing exception to this relationship, the relation between metropolitan affluence and pro-market voting is reversed in affluent suburbs.

- Residential mobility (in Canada, France and the United States); and
- Commuting or driving to work (in Canada and the United States).

Each type of poor suburbs supports parties with more welfare-statist orientations. In both types of poor communities, these statist orientations increase with the size of metropolitan areas. In more metropolitanised countries, however, the private property and private amenities of suburban places alter these effects. As the positive cross-level coefficient for these national contexts shows, many poor non-minority suburbs also harbour strong neoliberal countercurrents.

At the metropolitan scale, connectivity to the global economy, as well as overall affluence, strengthens support for pro-market parties.[21] In metropolitan areas favoured by the globalised market economy, and in places with the more privatised suburban lifestyles, neoliberal leanings are strongest. In the most urbanised communities at or near the metropolitan core, interests in collective consumption and redistribution contribute to welfare-statist orientations.

In the two postcommunist countries and in the distinctive metropolitan context of Israel, central cities remain bastions of neoliberal support. Here, and to a lesser degree in such Western European countries as France and Sweden, the continued attraction of urban centres for economic elites has altered the predominant patterns. Although class and demography remain of utmost importance to these patterns, they do not wholly dictate them. Suburban neoliberalism and the ideological polarisation surrounding it are thus also partly consequences of the differential effects of place.

The cultural dimension

Contrasts between liberalism and conservatism in the social and culture sphere also play an important role in producing and defining metropolitan political cleavages. The index to test this dimension of partisan ideological competition generally captured preferences related to traditional attitudes toward religion, gender and parental authority.[22] By and large, the socio-cultural dimension of political differences among localities reinforces the economic one (Table 14). To focus analysis on how the two dimensions differ, our modeling of the culture index included the values of the economic policy index as an independent variable (Table 14). These models therefore test whether the value of the socio-cultural index for each type of community stands to the Right (positive) or the Left (negative) of its position on the economic index.

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[21] This result is consistent with previous analyses of how favourable economic prospects in a globalised economy promote stronger market orientations among private professional workers (e.g. Kitschelt 1994). The territorial effect, however, suggests that perceptions of economic advantages from global connections extend beyond occupational or class effects. The cross-level model shows (model 4) that global connectivity of a metropolitan area fosters pro-market orientations particularly in larger municipalities and in poor nonminority suburbs.

[22] Unfortunately, insufficient data for our eleven countries did not allow us to examine in sufficient detail the materialism/post-materialism aspects of socio-cultural changes in this cross-national study. This remains an objective of future analyses.

Values of the economic index account for nearly half (48 %) of the variation in socio-cultural orientations. In countries with high rates of metropolitanisation, and where the Right has dominated national elections, the correspondence between the two dimensions is the strongest. By comparison with economic ideology, analyses of the country chapters suggest somewhat less consistent metropolitan spatial patterns in the cultural index. However, several significant divergences also set the socio-cultural dimension of metropolitan political ecology apart from the economic dimension.

One of the most striking contrasts appears in the most educated, highest income communities. In the affluent suburbs, comparatively liberal social and cultural attitudes accompany pro-market policy preferences. In ten of eleven countries, these suburbs average less socio-cultural conservatism than economic conservatism (Figure 6) (and in eight, such differences are significant at the 95% confidence level). The tendency is especially pronounced in the post-communist countries. As the multivariate tests presented in the country chapters of Sellers et al. (2013) confirmed, communities with higher socioeconomic status in Germany, Switzerland, the Czech Republic and Poland have voted more strongly for pro-market policy platforms than for cultural conservatism.

The socio-cultural dimension also reinforces the advantage of the Left in its urbanised strongholds. Post-materialist orientations in these settings comprise part of the challenge to traditional cultural values (Sellers and Walks 2013). In the pooled analysis, significant urban support for the Left emerges along the cultural dimension, even when it does not appear along the economic one (Table 14). In larger metropolitan areas and in countries where the Left has consistently won majorities, this relationship is significantly stronger.

Among the poor suburbs that support the Left along the economic dimension, the analysis confirms a tendency for the cultural dimension to undermine Left support. A cultural divide separates these suburbs from both the urban centres and the affluent suburbs. Poor suburbs generally support more conservative positions on the socio-cultural dimension than on the economic one (Figure 6). In every country but the United States, Canada and Sweden, the difference for at least one type of poor suburb exceeds the range between confidence intervals (Figure 6). The pooled regressions confirm this relationship for poor nonminority suburbs in countries where metropolitanisation is furthest advanced.[23]

Compared with the economic dimension, salience for the cultural dimension may give the Right a slight net advantage in metropolitan voting. Where the Right has dominated national elections, cross-level interactions with the economic index show that cultural conservatism has averaged significantly higher. Low density suburbs also swing significantly conservative along the cultural dimension, once a cross-level variable controls for Right majorities.

[23] A similar tendency among poor minority suburbs falls just short of statistical significance ($p<.10$), except in metropolitan areas with larger proportions of poor nonminority suburbs.

Table 14: Multi-level regression analysis of party support (cultural index and globalisation indexes) in metropolitan municipalities

	Cultural index		(Crosslevel effects)		Globalisation index		(Crosslevel effects)		(With ethnic diversity)	
	B	t	B	t	B	t	B	t	B	t
Intercept	0.93	1.12	0.89	1.06	1.50	1.59	1.18	1.21	1.18	1.21
Metropolitan effects										
Socio-spatial polarisation (metro)	0.06	0.17	-0.07	-0.18	*0.69*	*1.73*	*0.74*	*1.86*	*0.70*	*1.76*
Airport passengers/year (metro)	0.03	1.46	0.03	1.45	*0.04*	*1.80*	*0.04*	*1.81*	*0.04*	*1.79*
Metropolitan population (metro)	*-0.28*	*-1.75*	-0.25	-1.59	*-0.33*	*-1.85*	-0.27	-1.45	-0.27	-1.43
Metropolitan affluence (metro)	0.36	1.63	*0.40*	*1.81*	-0.28	-1.16	-0.22	-0.92	-0.24	-0.97
Municipal and crosslevel effects										
Urban concentrations	**-0.11**	**-2.70**	**-0.11**	**-2.86**	**-0.13**	**-2.23**	**-0.15**	**-2.70**	**-0.15**	**-2.69**
Affluent suburbs	**-0.13**	**-4.21**	**-0.08**	**-2.41**	**-0.28**	**-3.24**	0.31	1.47	0.28	1.35
Right wins (country)			**-0.08**	**-2.42**			**-0.51**	**-10.71**	**-0.52**	**-11.01**
Postcommunist (country)			**-0.11**	**-1.91**						
Metropolitan population (metro)							**-0.07**	**-2.11**	**-0.07**	**-1.97**
Low density suburbs	0.04	1.47	**0.08**	**2.44**	**0.13**	**4.55**	**0.23**	**5.03**	**0.22**	**4.88**
Right wins (country)			**-0.11**	**-2.91**						
Airport passengers/year (metro)							**-0.02**	**-2.89**	**-0.02**	**-2.79**
Municipal population	*-0.10*	*-1.87*	0.21	1.43	**-0.15**	**-2.55**	**0.65**	**2.56**	**0.66**	**2.63**
Left wins (country)			**-0.30**	**-6.58**			**-0.43**	**-4.40**	**-0.41**	**-4.20**
Right wins (country)							**-0.17**	**-3.56**	**-0.15**	**-3.15**
Metropolitanisation (country)			**0.00**	**1.96**						
Metropolitan polarisation (metro)			**0.15**	**2.04**						
Metropolitan population (metro)			**-0.08**	**-3.14**			**-0.11**	**-2.59**	**-0.11**	**-2.70**

Table 14 continued

	Cultural index		(Crosslevel effects)		Globalisation index		(Crosslevel effects)		(With ethnic diversity)	
	B	t	B	t	B	t	B	t	B	t
Poor nonminority suburbs	**0.09**	**2.40**	-0.11	-1.15	**0.16**	**3.60**	**-1.00**	**-3.75**	**-0.95**	**-3.45**
Metropolitanisation (country)			**0.00**	**2.18**						
Airport passengers/year (metro)							**-0.03**	**-3.58**	**-0.03**	**-3.47**
Metropolitan population (log)										
Poor minority suburbs	*0.18*	*1.93*	0.16	1.49	0.03	0.38	**0.89**	**2.57**	**1.05**	**3.01**
Ethnic diversity (country)									**-0.79**	**-2.44**
Poor nonminority concentrations (metro)			**0.34**	**2.89**						
Metropolitan polarisation (metro)							**0.67**	**1.90**	**0.84**	**2.28**
Metropolitan population (metro)							**-0.18**	**-3.16**	**-0.18**	**-3.11**
Economic ideology	**0.52**	**4.03**	*-0.43*	*-2.04*	**0.34**	**2.93**	**-0.43**	**-2.62**	**-0.48**	**-2.81**
Right wins (country)			**0.57**	**6.69**						
Left wins (country)							**-0.54**	**-4.70**	**-0.56**	**-4.71**
Metropolitanisation (country)			**0.01**	**4.87**			**0.02**	**6.96**	**0.02**	**7.02**
Metropolitan polarisation (metro)			*-0.19*	*-1.90*						
Metropolitan affluence (metro)							**-0.19**	**-2.47**	**-0.20**	**-2.48**
Log likelihood		-1686		-1660		-11503		-11524		-11525
Reliability: Level one		1.00		1.00		0.99		0.99		0.99
Level two		0.09		0.05		0.02		0.07		0.08
Variance explained										
Local		89%		89%		42%		42%		42%
Metropolitan		0%		0%		4%		4%		4%
Deviance		3371		3320		23007		23048		23050
Estimated parameters		89		100		142		102		103
N		12814		12814		12813		12813		12813

Notes: Coefficients are full maximum likelihood estimates in HLM3 module of HLM. For italicized coefficients, p<.10; for boldface coefficients, p<.05.

Due to the standardisation of the dependent variable around the mean for each country, linear country variables were insignificant and are not shown here.

Among the most metropolitanised countries, lower density also emerged as the most consistent contextual predictor of cultural conservatism (in France, Germany, Switzerland, the United States, and at the metropolitan level in Canada).

Metropolitan differences over cultural issues both reinforce and modify the effects of the divisions linked to economic ideology. Cultural liberalism has furnished the Left with bases of urban support that welfare statism does not, and enabled it to make inroads into some affluent suburbs. Cultural traditionalism has strengthened support for the Right in low density suburbs and beyond, and eroded support for the Left in poor non-minority suburbs.

The globalisation dimension

Rather than values linked to traditional culture, it is globalisation that marks the clearest new dimension of metropolitan cleavages that cross-cut economic ideology. Here the index incorporates a wide range of issues that partly overlap with both economic ideologies and traditional social values. The common thread among the issues in this index is attitudes toward diversity and cosmopolitanism, as expressed in opinions about international institutions and influences, immigration and multiculturalism. In the coding scheme, low values indicate cosmopolitanism and higher values ethno-nationalism.[24] Because the established Right and Left parties often maintain similar positions on these issues, voting for such parties on the Right as the French National Front and the Swiss People's Party, and such parties on the Left as the French Communists and the Greens, exert disproportionate influence on this index.

The Globalisation Index captures a distinct geography of ideological variation from either the socio-cultural values or economic ideology. The economic index accounts for less than one quarter (24 %) of the variation in positions related to globalisation, only half the variation in cultural attitudes.[25] Compared with economic issues, emphasis on issues surrounding globalisation may provide a diffuse advantage to the Left similar to the effects of cultural issues for the Right. The negative cross-level interactions between effects from the local economic index and national Left majorities indicate stronger Left support along the globalisation dimension, and contrast with the positive cross-level interactions in the opposite direction in the models for the cultural index. In more metropolitanised countries, however, neoliberal economic ideologies predict even stronger ethno-nationalism. This effect is even greater than the impact on cultural conservatism.

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[24] Comparative data for all eleven countries did not enable precise tests of the territorial effects from industrial and occupational restructuring hypothesised in Table 1.5 of the introduction (Sellers and Walks 2013). However, it is likely that our measures for metropolitan size, affluence and global connectivity partly capture effects from occupational clustering. Affluent and globally connected metropolitan regions contain bigger post-industrial private business sectors. These sectors may help to account for more cosmopolitan, culturally liberal and neoliberal orientations there, especially in affluent suburbs.

[25] Correspondence with the economic index ranges higher in more metropolitanised countries, but lower in more affluent metropolitan areas (Table 14, models 4 and 5).

Contrasts in wider regional and metropolitan contexts largely shape support for cosmopolitanism and ethno-nationalism. Overall, both global connectivity and metropolitan polarisation and diversity are linked to slightly higher metropolitan levels of ethno-nationalism ($p<.10$). In localities where economic preferences are more statist, however, metropolitan affluence generally fosters stronger cosmopolitanism. In countries as diverse as Israel, the United States, France and Poland, the largest, richest and best educated metropolitan regions have generally given stronger support to more cosmopolitan parties. Among urban concentrations, larger localities, and poor minority suburbs, metropolitan size has parallel cosmopolitan effects. Global connectivity reinforces cosmopolitanism in outlying low density suburbs and poor nonminority suburbs, but has a contrary effect among poor minority suburbs. The country chapters in Sellers et al. (2013) also point to a variety of more specific regional effects.[26]

Within metropolitan areas, the patterns are broadly consistent with the hypotheses of Sellers and Walks (2013) about the place effects of diversity.[27] Larger places generally expose residents to more diversity, and the larger municipalities clearly support cosmopolitanism. This support is especially pronounced in larger metropolitan areas, and in countries where the Left has dominated national elections. Urban concentrations also support cosmopolitanism just as strongly as they do cultural liberalism. In every country except Spain, these places vote more cosmopolitan than most suburbs. However, urban cores are not the only territorial sources of cosmopolitan voting. Coefficients for the affluent suburbs demonstrate more than twice as strong an effect on the globalisation index ($B=-.28$, $p=.01$) as on the cultural index ($B=-.13$, $p<.01$). In eight of the eleven countries, these suburbs give stronger average support to cosmopolitanism than they do to neoliberalism (Figure 6). As the cross level effects demonstrate, the effect concentrates in larger metropolitan areas and in those countries where the Right has consistently won national majorities.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, ethno-nationalism demonstrates greater strength in the metropolitan places most distant from urban concentrations and minority concentrations. Low density suburbs give stronger, more consistent support to ethno-nationalist parties than they do to cultural traditionalist ones. Ethno-nationalist leanings characterise these suburbs in every country except Israel, where social geographies of the outlying suburban areas reflect the distinctive history of Palestinian and Israeli settlement.

The majority in poor or poor nonminority suburbs typically retains some distance from minorities and immigrants, but may face competition with these groups for employment and services. In the multilevel models the coefficient for

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[26] Border regions of France, as well as Jerusalem in Israel, smaller metropolitan regions in Poland, Malmö and Stockholm in Sweden, and central and southern regions of the United States, harbour more ethno-nationalist preferences.

[27] Due to data unavailability for all metropolitan areas and localities, tests of these hypotheses were confined to cross-sectional local and national variations. Full testing would require analysis of metropolitan and regional effects, as well as longitudinal data on patterns of immigrant settlement.

these suburbs indicates a stronger relation to ethno-nationalist preferences (B=0.16, p<.01) than to traditionalism (B=0.09, p<.05).[28] In all eleven countries, ethno-nationalist preferences in these suburbs averaged higher on a standardised scale than neoliberal preferences. In six of the eleven countries the margin between the two indexes exceeded a 95 per cent confidence interval. Location in more globally connected metropolitan regions reverses this relationship, suggesting that the effects of globalisation are indeed multi-scalar.. Meanwhile, inconsistent relationships with ethno-nationalism among poor suburbs with concentrations of ethnic minorities suggest important interdependencies between national and local contexts.[29]

Orientations toward globalisation and multiculturalism bring out a separate dimension of partisan competition rooted in distinctive metropolitan divisions. This dimension has reinforced and broadened electoral advantages for cosmopolitan Left parties like the Greens in urbanised communities and in larger, more affluent, and in some respects more globalised metropolitan areas. In affluent suburbs, cosmopolitan parties have found new support. Among low density and suburbs and in less globalised metropolitan areas and regions, salience for this dimension has strengthened support for the Right. In the poor suburbs, where economic affinities generally remain with the Left, ethno-nationalist appeals have enabled the Right to make new inroads.

Metropolitanisation of partisan cleavages and competition

Throughout advanced industrial societies, and increasingly beyond them, the emerging context of metropolitan settlement has imposed a new political geography on partisan competition and ideology. Antiquated concepts like the urban-rural divide, or persistently relevant ones like social class, race and region, are inadequate to account for the resulting territorial lines of partisan competition.

The previous chapters in this book have explained the patterns within each country more fully. The more predominant metropolitan settlement has become, and the larger the metropolitan area, the more these types have taken on characteristic ideologies and partisan orientations (Table 15).

The partisan indexes employed in this chapter offer the first comparative transnational overview of these widespread new patterns of partisan allegiances. The consistent metropolitan patterns that emerged from the country chapters of

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[28] In four countries (Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Israel), ethno-nationalism in these suburbs averaged stronger than cultural traditionalism.

[29] Ethnic and racial diversity (measured here by the Fearon-Laitin index of ethnic fractionalization) contributes in specific settings to cosmopolitan attitudes. In countries with greater levels of fractionalization, such as Canada and the U.S., poor minority suburbs provide greater support to cosmopolitan parties (Model 5). Along with the effects hypothesised by Sellers and Walks (this volume), this effect may stem from the greater weight of poor minorities themselves in the local electorate of more diverse countries. In less fractionalised countries such as France or Sweden, the stronger ethno-nationalist voting in the same type of suburbs probably reflects a backlash among the larger native ethnic majority. Smaller minorities also help to account for the positive relationship between minorities or immigrants and ethno-nationalist voting in countries such as the Czech Republic, Germany and Poland.

Sellers et al. (2013) are unmistakable here. The rise of the Far Right in poor and low density suburbs and poorer, smaller metropolitan areas has expanded territorial constituencies for the Right. Affluent, middle class and low density suburbs vote for Market Liberal and moderate right parties. More urbanised communities and poor minority suburbs vote for the Left. Beyond the traditional strongholds of the Left in poor communities, the Moderate Left and especially the Greens have established new electoral bases in urbanised areas and to a degree in affluent and middle class suburbs. Overall, metropolitan support for the Left ranges higher in the largest metropolitan areas, on one hand, and in those more sheltered from the global economy on the other.

Table 15: Summary of selected results from pooled Multi-Level Regressions

	TURNOUT		LEFT-RIGHT INDEXES			
	Local	National	Self-placement	Economic	Cultural**	Globalization**
Intrametropolitan						
Urban concentrations (UR)	Higher				Left	Left
Municipal size (SZ)	Much Lower	Much Lower	Left			Left
Poor minority suburbs (PM)	Lower	Lower	Left	Left	(Right)	
Poor nonminority suburbs (PN)		Lower		Left	Right	Right
Affluent suburbs (AF)		Higher	Right	Right	Left	Left
Low density suburbs (LO)	Higher	Lower		Right		Right
*Metropolitan and related cross-level effects**						
Size (population, logged)	(Lower)		Left		(Left)	(Left)
	UR+	AF+, LO+, PN-	LO-R, SZ-R, PM-R	UR-L, AF-R, LO-R, PN-L, PM-L	SZ-L	AF-L, PM-L
Global connectivity	---	---	Right LO-R, SZ-L	Right SZ-R, PN-R		(Right) LO-L, PN-L
Affluence				Right AF-L		
Polarisation/diversity	UR+, SZ-	UR+ Lower				(Right)
	AF+	UR+, LO-	LO-L, SZ-R, PN-R, PM-R	LO-L	SZ-R	PM-R
*Country and related cross-level effects**						
Metropolitanisation			---	---	---	---
		UR-, AF+, LO+, PM-	LO-L, PN-R, PM-L	UR-L, LO-R, PN-R	SZ-R, PN-R	
Postcommunist/New democracies			---	---	---	---
			AF-L, LO-L		(AF-L)	
Right wins	---	---	---	---	---	---
			PN-R	AF-R	AF-L	AF-L, SZ-L
Left wins	---	---	---	---	---	---
					SZ-L	SZ-L

Notes: * = Significant linear effects in first row, cross-level effects immediately below;
** = Trends measured in relation to economic ideology. L = Favours Left; R = Favours Right;
--- = not tested in models. Relationships in parentheses significant at p<.10;
all other relationships significant at p<.05.

The country chapters of Sellers et al. (2013) demonstrated that these electoral patterns are linked to such contextual features of metropolitan places as urban density and homeownership, as well as class and demographic composition. Indices based on distinct ideological dimensions of partisan competition reveal significant variations in these metropolitan territorial effects. Juxtaposed with each other, and with the findings of consistent metropolitan differences in voter turnout, the indices expose the different strategic imperatives that the Left and the Right now face in their attempts to win the increasingly pivotal votes of metropolitan areas.

All told, parties of Right stand to gain the most from the ongoing metropolitanisation of politics. The gains are especially apparent for the neoliberal agendas that have been adopted with enthusiasm by many parties. New sources of support for marketisation have emerged in affluent, middle class and low-density suburbs. The more globally connected and the more affluent a metropolitan area is, the stronger its ideological leaning toward neoliberal policies. Cultural conservatism has reinforced support for the Right in many suburbs and smaller metropolitan areas, and enabled it to make inroads into long-time Leftist strongholds in poor nonminority suburbs. Ethno-nationalism, often fuelled by new Far Right parties, has enhanced and extended these bases of support. Along the globalisation dimension, the Right has won greater support among low-density suburbs and in more polarised, more diverse metropolitan areas. Along both dimensions these gains have come at the cost of losses among culturally liberal, cosmopolitan affluent suburbs and urban cores, and have occur despite counter-currents from the growing diversity and social complexity of metropolitan areas.

For parties of the Left, metropolitanisation creates a more limited set of opportunities. Left parties supporting statist over neoliberal economic and social policies have drawn on bases of support that are increasingly inconsistent. Along the other dimensions of partisan competition, the Left faces trade-offs that mirror those of the Right. Green and other culturally liberal parties have established solid bases of support in urban concentrations, in the larger localities of larger, more diverse metropolitan areas, and in affluent suburbs. Cosmopolitanism has generally reinforced these strongholds. Gains in these areas for Left parties have come at the cost of losses to traditionalist parties in poor and middle class suburbs, and to ethno-nationalist parties in poor suburbs, low-density suburbs, and in polarised metropolitan areas more generally.

Metropolitan patterns of electoral mobilisation have been even more decisive for the advantages of the Right. The affluent and middle class suburbs that have generally supported the Right turn out at the highest rates in national elections (Table 15). Among the large, urbanised communities where the Left has won support through cultural liberalism and cosmopolitanism, voter participation rates are consistently, and often dramatically lower than elsewhere. The persistent stronger electoral mobilisation among the suburban strongholds of the Right typically biases electoral results in its favour.

Although parties of the Left can and do win metropolitan majorities, the electoral logic growing out of metropolitanisation has favoured a gradual drift

toward neoliberalism on the Left as well as the Right. Affluent and middle class suburbs, and metropolitan areas integrated into global markets, comprise an ever growing proportion of potential voters. The poor suburbs and urbanised communities that give the strongest support to welfare statist policies have mobilised much less than places supportive of neoliberalism. As the Left has turned to cultural liberalism and especially cosmopolitanism, it has found new bases of support among affluent suburbs, cosmopolitan urban concentrations and large metropolitan areas. Many of these places are precisely the metropolitan settings where support for neoliberalism tends to be strongest. Those that harbour more support for welfare statist policy, such as the urban concentrations, mobilise less in elections. Metropolitan trends have thus given the Left as well as the Right electoral incentives to turn to neoliberal agendas. As an influence on partisan orientations, on voter participation, and ultimately on electoral strategies, metropolitanisation is a pervasive driving force behind the rise and entrenchment of neoliberalism.

Conclusion: Metropolitan sources of political behaviour

In most advanced industrial societies, the growth of extended metropolitan regions into the predominant mode of settlement is already an established fact. The importance of these regions for economics and governance has increasingly become apparent. As the analyses of this book have demonstrated, metropolitanisation also has important consequences for political behaviour. Metropolitan contexts decisively shape both whether citizens exercise the most fundamental political right of modern democratic citizenship, and the ideological orientations they bring to this task. Especially in countries with metropolitan majorities, metropolitan patterns of local interests, institutions, and cultural orientations have replaced the urban-rural divide and the segmented regions of pre-industrial and industrial society with an increasingly pervasive new political geography. Instead of the national uniformity among places predicted by the nationalisation thesis, metropolitanisation has embedded entrenched, inter-related divergences in local electoral behaviour.

Analysis of voter turnout shows that differences in this most basic act of political participation vary in ways that trace to local and metropolitan sources. Examination of these patterns casts new light on the role of voter participation in the layered governance of contemporary societies, and in particular on the relation between local and national electoral mobilisation. In conjunction with national institutions, metropolitan and local political subcultures have produced sometimes dramatically divergent patterns of electoral participation within the same country or even the same region. In this dimension of political behaviour, the systematic local and regional variations that metropolitanisation has introduced clearly contradict the thesis of nationalisation. In some places, such as the peripheral towns of metropolitan Switzerland and France, metropolitan patterns perpetuate traditional localised practices of political participation. In other places, such as U.S. and Polish urban regions, metropolitan settlement has produced a variegated geography of de-localised participation.

Partisan cleavages reflect much more than divisions between social classes, urban and rural areas, or regional ethnic traditions. They are also a result of the consumption interests, assets, and cultural practices arising from, and located in, distinct types of metropolitan places, and the different positions of metropolitan economies in the global economy. Throughout the advanced industrial world, suburbanisation and the variable geometry of metropolitan economic advantage and disadvantage have been much more than products of neoliberalism. They are drivers of the political dynamics that have embedded neoliberalism in party platforms and public policy around the world.

As a result of these trends, Left parties now often compete for national power on terms that tend to favour the Right. The affluent and middle class metropolitan strongholds of the Right make up growing proportions of national electorates. These places mobilise more consistently and more strongly than the more urbanised, more disadvantaged metropolitan strongholds of the Left. The sources of new support for the Left in urban concentrations and in affluent communities stem more from culturally liberal or cosmopolitan values than from opposition to marketisation or privatisation. Voters in these places harbour either ambivalence or outright opposition toward welfare statist approaches in economic and social policy. Urbanised communities also turn out less often to vote. In poor and low-density suburbs, backlash from cultural liberalism and cosmopolitanism have further undermined support for the Left. The resulting electoral incentives for both the Left and the Right have compounded the social and economic disadvantages of poor metropolitan communities with chronic underrepresentation in election campaigns and in public policy.

The widespread shift toward metropolitanisation provides both a powerful explanation for these convergent developments, and a basis for understanding significant variations in them. The study of metropolitanisation also contributes in several broader ways to understandings of how contexts shape political behaviour.

First of all, this study points to a layered dimension of political contexts that has rarely been examined systematically. One consistent conclusion has been that contextual effects at different scales depend on and interact with each other. The size of a community has different effects on turnout in a larger or a smaller metropolitan area. Urban cores can harbour Leftist orientations in the largest metropolitan regions, but Rightist orientations in more globally-connected or smaller metros. Metropolitan and local effects, as the analysis of election turnout showed, can also work in different ways under distinct national systems of institutions. Analyses of such contextual factors as ethnic and racial diversity at a single scale have failed to capture these multilevel influences, which are often crucial to the operational significance of context.

Second, our study demonstrates the need to capture the increasingly dynamic, contingent relations between territory and political behaviour. By definition, metropolitan areas are functionally interrelated to a degree that earlier, less integrated cities and regions were not. In the course of a single days' shopping or commuting to work and back, metropolitan citizens participate in the life of numerous communities. Metropolitan areas themselves are constantly

changing, not only in territorial extent and in the porousness of their boundaries, but in the social, cultural and economic dynamics underlying political behaviour and ideology. The thickness of inter-metropolitan economic and social connections, including the quantum leap in capacities to transcend territory that the internet and other new media have made possible, add to this dynamism. It should come as little surprise that some of the most significant contextual influences on metropolitan voting patterns reflect complex partisan swings among metropolitan constituencies rather than rigidly consistent territorial patterns.

This study represents the first systematic cross-national examination of metropolitanisation and its political consequences. Several types of inquiry remain necessary to further elaborate and test the analyses undertaken here, and as noted above, due to data limitations it has not been possible to test all of the conceptual relationships hypothesized in the introduction. At the macro level of the nation-state, relationships between the metropolitanisation of society, culture and the economy, and the emergence of political divides within metropolitan regions remain to be probed more deeply. Comparative historical analysis of the trajectories in national policy and their links to metropolitan change, a connection that has already been drawn in work on the United States (e.g. Mollenkopf 1983; Dreier et al. 2001) remains necessary to account more fully for the transformations this research has revealed. At the micro level of citizens, more sophisticated approaches to analysis of cross-national surveys must be developed to account for the multi-layered contextual effects this study has revealed. Even the most elaborate national or cross-national surveys rarely sample on sufficiently detailed contextual factors to enable these to be tested in relation to individual attributes as well as to each other. A further need persists for more intensive qualitative and quantitative investigation of metropolitan effects at the local level itself, including the scale of neighbourhoods. Community studies of this kind can provide some of the most crucial evidence about the links between individual and collective behaviour, as well as between the numerous layers of collective action.

The most powerful impetus to further advances in the study of metropolitan political behaviour is the gathering force of metropolitanisation itself. By the late twenty-first century metropolitan areas are predicted to be the predominant form of settlement in every world region (United Nations 2009). As the examples in this volume suggest, metropolitan political ecologies outside of Western Europe and North America will bring about new and often distinctive variations on the themes elaborated here. Economic, cultural, and political divisions among metropolitan places will remain as fundamental a feature of politics as the city itself has long been.

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Appendixes

Party family classification

Following Lipset and Rokkan (1967), parties can be seen to have formed around social cleavages, and parties that were mobilised on the same side of the same cleavage can be seen to constitute a separate party family. Typologies of party families given in the literature vary considerably (Mair and Mudde 1998: 223). There is, however, a common core of seven party families that also apply to party systems outside of Western Europe: far left (e.g. communist and ex-communist parties), greens, centre left (e.g. social democrats), centre right (e.g. Christian democrats), market liberals, far right (e.g. populist right), as well as regional and ethnic parties (e.g. regionalist and separatist parties). Parties in individual countries were classified into these seven party families by the authors of Sellers et al. (2013) (Table A1).

Table A1: Classification of national parties into party families

	Far left	Greens	Centre left	Market liberal	Centre right	Far right	Ethnic and regional parties	Others
USA			Democratic Party		Republican Party			
Canada		Green Party of Canada	NDP: New Democratic Party	Liberal Party of Canada	Conservative Party of Canada		Bloc Québécois	Difference to 100%
UK			Labour Party	Liberal Democratic Party	Conservative Party		Plaid Cymru SNP: Scottish National Party	GPEW: Green Party of England and Wales Others
France	LCR: Besancenot PT: Gluckstein PCF: Hue LO: Laguiller	LV: Mamère	MDC: Chevênement PS: Jospin	DL: Madelin	UDF: Bayrou FRS: Boutin RPR: Chirac CAP21: Lepage	FN: Le Pen MNR: Mégret		CPNT: Saint-Josse PRG: Taubira
Switzerland		GPS: Green Party of Switzerland	SPS: Social Democratic Party of Switzerland	FDP: Radical Democratic Party LPS: Swiss Liberal Party	CVP: Christian Democratic Party	SVP: Swiss People's Party		All other small parties (LdU, EVP, CSP, PdA, FGA, SD, EDU, FPS, Lega, Sol.)
Germany	PDS: Party of Democratic Socialism	The Greens	SPD: Social Democratic Party of Germany	FDP: Free Democratic Party	CDU: Christian Democratic Union			Republicans NPD: National Democratic Party of Germany Others
Spain	IU: United Left		PSOE: Socialist Party		PP: Popular Party		RD: Regionalist Right RI: Regionalist Left	Minorities
Sweden	V: Left Party	Green Party	SAP: Swedish Social Democratic Party	FP: Liberal People's Party C: Centre Party	KD: Christian Democrats M: Moderate Party			Difference to 100%

Table A1 continued

	Far left	Greens	Centre left	Market liberal	Centre right	Far right	Ethnic and regional parties	Others
Poland	PPS: Polish Socialist Party National Party of Retirees and Pensioners Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (Sambroona)		SLD: Democratic Left Alliance UP: Labour Union	UW: Freedom Union KLD: Liberal Democratic Congress UD: Democratic Union	PSL: Polish People's Party AWS: Solidarity Electoral Action PO: Civic Platform Independent Self-governing Trade Union "Solidarity" Catholic Election Committee BBWR: Non-Party Block for Supporting Reforms	PiS: Law and Justice LPR: League of Polish Families ROP: Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland PC: Centre Agreement KPN: Confederation for an Independent Poland	German Minority NMGS: German Minority of Upper Silesia RAS: Silesian Autonomy Movement	Social Alternative Movement PWN: Polish National Community PUG: Polish Economic Union PL: Peasants Agreement KDR: Coalition for the Republic Party "X" Others (Difference to 100%)
Israel			Avoda (Labor party) Shinuy Am Echad Meretz	Likud	Israel Baaliya (Russian immigrants) Merkaz	Halchud Haleumi Mafdal (national religious) Yahadut Hatora (ultra-orthodox) Shas (ultra-religious) Ihud Leumi Israel Beitenu (Russian immigrants)	Balad Hadash Aravit Meuchedet	Difference to 100%

Table A1 continued

	Far left	Greens	Centre left	Market liberal	Centre right	Far right	Ethnic and regional parties	Others
Czech Republic	KSCM: Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia LB: Left Block	SZ: The Green Party	SDLSNS: Free Democrats-Liberal National Social Party CSSD: Czech Social Democracy DZJ: Pensioners for Social Security SDL: Party of the Democratic Left CMUS: Bohemian-Moravian Union of Centre CSNS: Czech National Social Party HA: Humanistic Alliance NH: New Movement SZR: Party of Common Sense SVOS: Party of Countryside-Unified Civic Forces CSD: Czech Social Democratic Movement SZJ: Party for Social Security SDS: Party of Democratic Socialism	ODS: Civic Democratic Party ODA: Civic Democratic Alliance US: Union of Freedom	DEU: Democratic Union KDU: Christian Democratic Union CP: Czech Right DL: Democratic League VPB: Choice for the Future NADEJE: Hope CZ: The Way of Change KDUUSDEU (coalition election '02) PB: Right Block	SPRRSC: Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia NDS: National Democratic Party REPMS: Republicans of Miroslav Sladek REP: Republicans	MNS: Moravian National Party HSMS: Movement for Self-Governing Moravia and Silesia MDS: Moravian Democratic Party ROI: Romany Civic Initiative	NEZAV: Independents OK: Civic Coalition BPS: Balbin's Poetic Party AZDS: Action for Abolition of Senate SNK: Association of Independent Candidates

Table A2. Definition of variables

Name	Variable description	Source
Country variables		
Metropolitanisation	Percent living in metropolitan areas with over 200,000 population, early 2000s	Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers 2005
Civic localism	Local government system	Sellers and Kwak 2011
Nationalised local government	Local government system	Sellers and Kwak 2011
Local elitism	Local government system	Sellers and Kwak 2011
Third wave democracies	Democratisation from 1980s	Huntington 1993
Proportional representation (national)	PR in national lower house elections	Blais et al. 2003
Proportional representation (local council)	From country factsheets, World Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy	United Cities and Local Governments 2008
Election day holiday	Election day is holiday or rest day	Blasi et al. 2003
Easy voting index	Multi-item index of measures to make voting easier	Blais et al. 2003
Election day registration	Voter registration permitted on election day	Blais et al. 2003
Compulsory registration	All eligible voters automatically registered	Blasi et al. 2003
Ethnic diversity	Fearon-Laitin index of ethnic diversity	Fearon 2003
Right wins	Right wins all national elections during period	Own calculation
Left wins	Left wins all national elections during period	Own calculation
Metropolitan variables		
Population concentration	Herfindahl index of population concentration by municipality	Calculated from country databases
Geopolitical fragmentation	Index measuring (1) municipalities per person, and (2) percent population in central city	Zeigler and Brunn 1980
Sociospatial polarisation	Three-item Simpson index based on proportions of affluent suburbs, poor suburbs and others	Calculated from country databases
City-suburban polarisation	Multi-item Nathan-Adams index of central-city disadvantage relative to suburbs	Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers 2005
Metropolitan population	Population as of early 2000s	From country databases
Metropolitan affluence	Proportion of municipalities classified as affluent or middle class suburbs	Calculated from country databases
Poor nonminority concentrations (metro)	Proportion of municipalities classified as poor nonminority	Calculated from country databases
Poor minority concentrations (metro)	Proportion of municipaliteis classified as minority	Calculated from country databases
Airport passengers/year (metro)	Total annual passengers for all airports in metropolitan area	Airport Council International 2007
Local variables		
Population (log)	Municipal population	From country databases
Urban concentrations	1=yes, 0=no	From country databases
Affluent suburbs	1=yes, 0=no	From country databases
Poor minority suburbs	1=yes, 0=no	From country databases
Poor nonminority suburbs	1=yes, 0=no (includes poor suburbs for countries without poor minority suburbs)	Calculated from country databases
Low density suburbs	1=yes, 0=no	From country databases

Typology of Municipalities

Following cluster and factor analysis of the characteristics of municipalities in several countries, a hierarchical factor analytical procedure was devised to classify metropolitan municipalities into six common categories. Each category captured a type of municipality that could be found in most, if not all of the countries. The types included urban concentrations, low density suburbs, affluent suburbs, poor suburbs, minority suburbs (separated from other poor suburbs where possible), and middle class suburbs.

This typology served two purposes. Most important, following the example of Orfield (2001), it provided an initial basis for analyzing the variations in types of communities and the relation to partisanship and turnout. Beyond this, it also served as one among several tests of ecological effects on municipal electoral behavior that could not be captured through demographic composition alone.

For classification the following steps are carried out:

1. *Urban concentrations*: First, the central cities were separated out in each metropolitan area. Additionally, a set of factors was used to separate out other essentially urban metropolitan towns:
    a) All metropolitan municipalities with half or more of the population of the largest municipality were designated as urbanised core areas.
    b) In addition, other large urban concentrations were placed in this category. These include places with over 100,000 inhabitants.
    c) Localities with densities less than that of the central city were excluded from this type.
2. *Low density suburbs*: A factor based on density, new housing and (where available) distance from the centre was used to separate out low-density peripheral suburbs.
3. For the remaining towns, a factor based on the dimensions of socioeconomic status derived from indicators for income, poverty, housing, education, unemployment, dependents, university education, highest status occupational group, and homeownership) is used to separate out:
    a) *Affluent suburbs*: The most privileged communities.
    b) *Poor suburbs*: The least privileged communities. Where possible, this type has been subdivided into two distinct types:
        - *Poor minority suburbs*: a factor based on racial/ethnic diversity was used to separate out high-minority or high-immigrant concentrations from other poor communities. In the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, Spain, and Switzerland, this factor corresponded so closely with socio-economic status that no distinct poor minority suburbs could be distinguished. In Sweden, only one poor municipality fell within this category, but several inner city

districts did. This type was only separated out for purposes of the country chapter in the analysis of municipal turnout (which used inner city districts and peripheral municipalities). It was employed in the pooled analysis.

- *Poor suburbs (non-minority)*: least privileged communities with low racial/ethnic diversity.

4. *Middle class suburbs*: All remaining municipalities were placed in this category.

Cut-points for the designation of communities in steps 2 and 3 varied with the patterns of distribution. As in the designation of metropolitan boundaries, cross-national differences in relevant measures as well as in concentrations of population, privilege and disadvantage required distinctions between similar types of places to be calculated using measures and cut-points distinct to each country. The following table summarised the principles used to distinguish the different types by country:

Table A3: Derivation of municipal typology, by country

Country		Low density suburbs	Affluent suburbs	Poor suburbs	Minority suburbs	Middle class suburbs
United States	Factors	housing built since 1980, population density	affluence index through principle components analysis, based on per capita income, education, unemployment and poverty rates	indicators for race, ethnicity and immigration		…
	Separators	top quartile of housing built since 1980 and lower half of population density	municipalities above 80th percentile as measured in affluent index	bottom 30% as measured in affluent index that did not match the additional criteria for minority suburbs	bottom 30% as measured in affluent index and 10% or more foreign-born populations, 25% or more African-Americans or 25% or more Hispanic Americans	Remaining municipalities
Canada	Factors	population density	high socioeconomic status	low income, high proportion of the population facing hardship indicators for visible minorities and immigrants		
	Separators	areas with population density significantly below the suburban average (cutoff of 500 persons / km^2)	suburban areas with combined index of average household income and high-status occupations > 20% above the CMA average for the index	suburban areas with a hardship index > 20% above the average AND average household incomes less than 90 percent of the CMA average - below-average proportion of visible minorities and immigrants	suburban areas with a hardship index > 20% above the average AND average household incomes less than 90 percent of the CMA average - above-average proportion of visible minorities and immigrants	all remaining suburban constituencies

United Kingdom[30]	Factors	Population density	Socioeconomic status, proportion of the population facing hardship	proportions of visible minorities and/or immigrants		…
	Separators	Areas with population densities significantly lower than the metropolitan average (cut off of 900 pers./km^2)	suburban areas with levels of socioeconomic status 20% higher than metropolitan average, and levels of hardship approximately 20% below average	Levels of disadvantage and hardship greater than 25% higher than metropolitan average[31], proportion of visible minorities and/or immigrants below metropolitan average	Levels of disadvantage and hardship greater than 25% higher than metropolitan average2, proportion of visible minorities and/or immigrants above metropolitan average	Remaining suburban districts
France	Factors	Density	factor using indicators for income and higher education	unemployment rate and minority status (measured by foreign-born population)		…
	Separators	40th percentile or below	90th or higher percentile	unemployment rates in the 70th percentile or higher and residents born abroad below 85th percentile	unemployment rates in the 70th percentile or higher and residents born abroad in the 85th percentile or higher	Remaining municipalities
Switzerland	Factors	factor based on density, new housing, and distance to the centre	factor based on low education, retirees, unemployment, foreigners, low socioeconomic status, non-western European language, university education, highest status occupational group, and homeownership			
	Separators	third 25th percentile	third 33rd percentile	first 33rd percentile	N.A.	in-between first and third 33rd percentile

[30] Types of districts based on characteristics derived from the 2001 census at the level of parliamentary constituencies.

[31] Metro average excluding Greater London conurbations (for Greater London conurbations: London average proportion foreign born.

Germany[32]	Factors	population density	standardised hardship index based on unemployment rate, living space per capita, university degree, local tax rates			
	Separators	lowest quartile	top quartile	lowest quartile	N.A.	in-between lowest and top quartile
Spain	Factors	density and distance to the centre	Two criteria: (1) socioeconomic factor based on: low occupational status (% manual workers), unemployment rate, low educational status (% less than university) and living space (household members/household surface) (2) immigration: % population born abroad			
	Separators	lowest quartile of density and highest quartile of distance to the centre (simultaneously)	(1) socioeconomic: highest quartile	(1) socioeconomic: lowest quartile (2) immigration: < median	(1) socioeconomic: lowest quartile (2) immigration: > median	(1) socioeconomic: second and third quartiles
Sweden	Factors	factor of income and education, factor of density and distance to the center	factor of income and education	factor of income and education, percentage born abroad	factor of income and education, percentage born abroad	factor of income and education, factor of density and distance to the center
	Separators	medium socioeconomic status, low density/long distance	high socioeconomic status	low socioeconomic status, low percentage born abroad	low socioeconomic status, high percentage born abroad	medium socioeconomic status, high density/short distance
Poland	Factors	index based on population density, new housing per capita (2001-2005), (minus) weighted by distance from the central city	hardship index based on Nathan and Adams concept using the sum of the standardised values of different indicators: level of unemployment 2002, level of education 2002 (proportion of residents with university degrees among all residents 15 years and older), housing conditions 2002 (number of rooms per capita), wealth of local population 2002 (average income of tax payer), and dependency index 2002 (proportion of population of non-productive age)			…
	Separators	lowest quartile	lowest quartile	highest quartile	N.A.	remaining municipalities

[32] In view of socioeconomic differences in Western and Eastern Germany the author created a separate typology of communes for these two parts of the country.

Czech Republic	Factors	population density	socio-economic index through principal component analysis; indicators: percentage of poor households 2003, unemployment rate 2001, population with low (lower than secondary) education, percentage of university graduates, percentage of people older than 65 years, and per capita revenue of municipality from personal taxes paid by local citizens			…
	Separators	lowest quintile	highest quartile	lowest quartile	N.A.	remaining municipalities
Israel	Factors					
	Separators		SES 8-10 (10 – highest)	SES 1-4	Arab majority	SES 5-7

Partisan Ideological Indexes

Indexes of partisan ideology were constructed on the basis of responses among voters for each party to questions about those issues in post-electoral or other contemporaneous surveys. Insofar as possible, the items employed in the indexes came from a battery of identical questions posed in most of the countries in the study as part of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) or the World Values Survey (WVS) from 1998 to 2003.[33]

The indexes were designed to provide clear, cross-nationally equivalent metrics to assess the ideological propensities of the parties, and ultimately the communities that voted for them. This purpose made formative indexes more appropriate for the analysis than the reflective indexes that have often been used in survey research (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Questions chosen for each index captured a range of issues for which responses could be arrayed along the same general conceptual axis. In a formative index, each item measures a potentially different component of the common dimension. As a result, unlike a reflective index, this type of index cannot be constructed through a method based on correlations among item responses such as factor analysis (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001; Coltman et al. 2008). Indeed, a formative index requires no correlation among the individual items to be valid. Instead, items aggregated into each index were simply assigned equal weight and a standardised range.

Surveys and items used for the three dimensional indices in each country are published in Sellers and Rochat (2013).

[33] Exceptions were made for Switzerland and on some items for Poland, where low levels of party identification left sample sizes for some parties in these cross-national surveys too small to permit reliable inferences. For Canada, the indexes employed later surveys more contemporaneous to the elections in the analysis. In all these cases, the questions employed remained similar if not virtually identical to those used to construct the indexes in the other countries.

Municipal Ideological Positions

Drawing on the partisanship indices, average issue positions of communal electorates were constructed on the basis of the percentage of votes for each party in a given commune. This portion of the analysis applies a formula developed by Gross and Sigelman (1984) to estimate the "ideological centre of gravity" for a community.

For each municipality, this procedure applies the following formula:

$$Pos_i = \sum_{p=1}^{n} \frac{pos_p \cdot votes_{p,i}}{votes_i}$$

where:

pos = issue position
i = municipality
p = party
n = number of parties with votes in municipality i

The same procedure was employed to derive estimates of left-right self-placement for each municipality.

The resulting ideological estimates require important caveats for proper interpretation. As artefacts of both party performance in a community and the positions of the aggregated national electorate for the parties, they represent a mapping of wider patterns of party competition as well as the actual preferences of the local voters. To fully sort out these elements, and to test the entire pathway of effects from metropolitanisation on voters, parties and axes of partisan competition, would require a much more complex research design than has thus far been attempted.

The current analysis suffices to show that, however these causes sort out, the metropolitan patterns they have produced are now a fixture of contemporary politics.